Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 75

Issue 4

Article 4

2-19-2019

Rehabilitating the Nuisance Injunction to Protect the Environment
Doug Rendleman
Washington and Lee University School of Law, rendlemand@wlu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, Law and Economics
Commons, Legal Remedies Commons, Litigation Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Doug Rendleman, Rehabilitating the Nuisance Injunction to Protect the Environment, 75 Wash. &
Lee L. Rev. 1859 (2018).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol75/iss4/4
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington and
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law
Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

Rehabilitating the Nuisance Injunction
to Protect the Environment
Doug Rendleman*
Abstract
The Trump Administration has reversed the federal
government’s role of protecting the environment. The reversal
focuses attention on states’ environmental capacity. This Article
advocates more vigorous state environmental tort remedies for
nuisance and trespass.
An injunction is the superior remedy in most successful
environmental litigation because it orders correction and
improvement. Two anachronistic barriers to an environmental
* E.R. Huntley Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School
of Law. Thanks for close collegial readings and candid comments to professors
Daniel Farber, John Golden, Alexandria Klass, Douglas Laycock, and Henry
Smith. Thanks to student research assistants Martha Vazquez, Trista BishopWatt, Jenna Fierstein, Ernest Hammond, Sills O’Keefe, Ryan Starks, and Scott
Weingart for their help with the citations and footnotes. Thanks also to the
Frances Lewis Law Center for support. This paper benefitted from comments at
presentations at the Remedies Discussion Forum at Prato, Italy, the Association
of Law, Property, and Society at the University of Minnesota, the Faculty Enclave
at Washington and Lee, and the Property Remedies Discussion Forum at
Universite Paul Cezanne, Aix Marseille, France.
This Article’s genesis was years of developing and teaching law school
casebooks that included Boomer v. Atlantic Cement as a principal decision.
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970); DOUG RENDLEMAN,
COMPLEX LITIGATION: INJUNCTIONS, STRUCTURAL REMEDIES, AND CONTEMPT
178– 94 (2010); DOUG RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, REMEDIES 1208–14 (9th
ed. 2018) and earlier editions. The casebooks comprise a rough “first draft” of this
Article. A later draft was published in Europe as a book chapter with a different
title; its emphasis and conclusions foreshadow this revision. Doug Rendleman,
Rejecting Property Rules-Liability Rules for Boomer’s Nuisance Remedy: The Last
Tour You Need of Calabresi and Melamed’s Cathedral, in REMEDIES AND PROPERTY
43 (Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille, Russell Weaver & Francois Lichere
eds. 2013). This draft was also posted on SSRN in 2013, Number 2212384. From
the beginning, understanding and reacting to the New York decisions and the
Cathedral article’s treatment of remedies influenced my teaching and casebooks.
Over the years, qualifications and refinements surfaced, prompted by developing
thought and scholarship.
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injunction are the New York Court of Appeals’ decision, Boomer v.
Atlantic Cement, and Calabresi and Melamed’s early and iconic
law-and-economics article, One View of the Cathedral. This Article
examines and criticizes both because, by subordinating the
injunction to money damages, they undervalue public health and
environmental protection and militate against effective private-law
remedies for environmental torts.
This Article advocates flexible and pragmatic common-law
techniques instead of law-and-economics analysis. Moreover,
behavioral economists’ studies have undermined and qualified
many law-and-economics theories. In addition to arguing for more
and better injunctions, this Article criticizes the law-and-economics
mindset that nuisance-trespass parties’ post-injunction negotiation
will convert an injunction into an excessive money settlement. It
also shows that the Cathedral article’s vocabulary and four-rule
organization are both too long and too short as well as confusing
and misleading.
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I. Introduction
As the first half of the Trump Administration ends, the federal
government’s environmental goal is deregulation.1 The EPA and
the Departments of Energy and Interior are unraveling
long-standing environmental policies through executive and
administrative
measures.2
The
Harvard
Law
School
Environmental and Energy Law Program sends regular emails
updating the Administration’s deregulatory trajectory. Setbacks
for environmental protection include rescission of or weakened
federal government support for the Paris Climate accord, the
Clean Power Plan, the Clean Water Rule, and national

1. See Nadja Popovich et al., 76 Environmental Rules on the Way Out Under
N.Y.
TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/05/
Trump,
climate/trump- environment-rules-reversed.html (last updated July 6, 2018) (last
visited Dec. 3, 2018) (stating that “the Trump Administration has sought to
reverse more than 70 environmental regulations” in accordance with its priority
of eliminating federal regulations) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
2. See id. (tracking policies that have been overturned, or which are in the
process of being overturned, through the administrative, executive, legislative,
and judicial processes).
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monuments.3 One of the most serious retreats is the proposal to
freeze fuel efficiency standards for cars and trucks through 2026.4
The federal government’s retreat focuses attention on state,
local, and private initiatives.5 As part of the complex legal
environment, this Article examines remedies for private
nuisances. With an eye to augmented private-law nuisance and
related trespass remedies, it argues for more and more-detailed
injunctions as environmental remedies. The injunction is the
remedy that a court can use to forbid misconduct and order positive
conduct. In public-law regulatory litigation, the court’s choice is
between an injunction and nothing.6 But in the private-law
litigation this Article examines, the court’s choice is between an
injunction and damages.7
Two barriers to a more robust environmental injunction have
passed their fortieth birthdays and are primed for mid-life crises
3. See
Regulatory
Rollback
Tracker,
ENVTL. L. AT HARV.,
http://environment.law.harvard.edu/policy-initiative/regulatory-rollback-tracker/
(last updated Sept. 25, 2018) (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (tracking key regulatory
rollbacks of the Trump Administration, including rollbacks having to do with the
Paris Climate Agreement, Clean Power Plan, Clean Water Rule, and reduced size
of national monument land) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
See also Richard L. Revesz, Opinion, On Climate, the Facts and Law are Against
Trump,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Dec.
4,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/04/opinion/climate-report-trump.html
(last
visited Dec. 10, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
4. See Brady Dennis & Michael Laris, California Blasts Trump Proposal to
Freeze Fuel-efficiency Standards as ‘Flawed’ and ‘Illegal’, WASH. POST (Oct. 26,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/californiablasts-trump-proposal-to-freeze-fuel-efficiency-standards-as-nihilistic-andillegal/2018/10/25/86fedb76-d8a6-11e8-83a2d1c3da28d6b6_story.html?utm_term=.eec49c826e9f (last visited Dec. 3, 2018)
(discussing California’s resistance to this measure) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
5. See Karen Sloan, NYU Law Center to Help State AGs Protect
Environment,
LAW.COM
(Aug.
21,
2017,
2:30
PM),
https://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2017/08/21/nyu-law-center-to-help-state-agsprotect-environment/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (“New York University initiated a
State Energy & Environmental Impact Center for state governments to turn to
as a resource in developing state and local efforts.”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review). See generally Mark Nevitt & Robert V. Percival, Could
Official Climate Denial Revive the Common Law as a Regulatory Backstop?, 96
WASH. U. L. REV. 441 (2018).
6. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1281 (1976).
7. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E. 2d 870, 871–75 (N.Y. 1970).
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and reconsideration. These are the New York Court of Appeals’
decision in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement8 and Calabresi and
Melamed’s nearly contemporaneous Cathedral article.9 This
Article will re-examine both to bring some perspective to their
remarkable longevity and their influence in favoring damages over
injunctions, to express skepticism about each, and to develop
qualifications and refinements.
Major among other pressing environmental problems, global
warming and climate change defy a single solution.10 Ameliorative
techniques range from altering individual habits to local, regional,
national, and international measures.11 Both private-law
approaches, like nuisance, and public-law regulation, litigation
and regulation are available legal techniques against global
warming and climate change.12
Sympathetic with augmented protection for the environment,
I wrote this Article from my perspective in the remedies branch of
process-oriented legal realism. By arguing for more and
more-detailed injunctions, I hope to strike a small blow against
environmental deterioration, including, in the long run, global
warming and climate change.
After short introductions, this Article turns in Part II to the
example of a neighboring property owner’s particulate-pollution
private-nuisance lawsuit based on Boomer. The Article moves in
Part III to the Cathedral article’s four options for a nuisance court’s
solution to the pollution problem. It discusses each of the options
and the choices between them.
In brief, Boomer and the Cathedral article favor damages over
injunctions and militate against optimal pollution remedies.13 Part
IV adds some further considerations and suggestions under a new
8. 257 N.E. 2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
9. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
10. See Responding to Climate Change, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN.,
https://climate.nasa.gov/solutions/adaptation-mitigation/ (last updated Aug. 28,
2018) (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
11. See id.
12. See F. Andrew Hessick, The Challenge of Remedies, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
739, 741 (2013).
13. See Boomer, 257 N.E. 2d at 875; see also Calabresi & Melamed, supra
note 9, at 1121.
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general head of “Rule 5.” The final Part V before the Conclusion,
Part VI, explains procedural considerations related to the
plaintiff’s injunction remedy.
A. Remedy
A remedy, as this Article uses the term, is what a court can do
for a successful plaintiff. The antecedent issue of the defendant’s
substantive liability is distinct from, but not divorced from, the
later question of the plaintiff’s remedy.14 “[T]he creation of a right,”
Justice Thomas wrote in eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,15 “is
distinct from the provision of remedies for violations of that
right.”16 The successful plaintiff’s remedy should advance, at least
it should not retard, the substantive law’s policy. Except in one
segment, this Article assumes that the defendant is liable to the
plaintiff under the substantive law and examines what the court
can do as a remedy for the successful plaintiff.
The court’s remedial inquiry invokes its judgment on two
general issues. First, the court must choose the plaintiff’s remedy.
In this Article, the court’s principal choice is how to deploy two
remedies, compensatory damages and an injunction.17 The court’s
ancillary remedial choices concern punitive damages and
restitution.18 Second, after choosing the plaintiff’s remedy, the
court must measure or define it.19 If the court, judge or jury,
awards the plaintiff compensatory damages, what amount should
they be?20 If the court grants the plaintiff an injunction, what of
the defendant’s conduct should it require or forbid?21

14. See Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term Foreword: The Forms
of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 47 (1979).
15. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
16. Id. at 392.
17. See discussion infra Part III.C.
18. See discussion infra Parts IV.B.3–4.
19. See discussion infra Part V.
20. See discussion infra Part V.
21. See discussion infra Part V.

REHABILITATING THE NUISANCE INJUNCTION

1865

B. Regulation Versus Litigation
But, someone will ask, isn’t environmental administrative law
top-down regulation based on federal statutes instead of
litigation-based, state common law trespass and nuisance? Federal
regulation is necessary and has been successful for many national
problems. Decentralized private tort litigation, in addition to
compensating individuals, complements public regulation.22 As
Professor Klass has shown, state common law is an important part
of environmental protection.23 Mr. Abelkop has added:
[E]nvironmental and public health problems call for multiple
policy instruments, and tort law and public regulatory rules
usually
operate
as
complements,
not
substitutes
. . . . Ultimately, the choice of policy instruments will turn on
contextual factors including the nature of the problem, the
attributes of the parties involved, the political climate, the
available data, and some manifestation of the evaluative
criteria.24

The Trump Administration’s retreat increases private law’s
role.25 Lawyers seeking to protect the environment have numerous
reasons to turn to state common law nuisance and trespass. State
and federal regulation may be absent, lax, or difficult to enforce.26

22. See Adam D.K. Abelkop, Tort Law as an Environmental Policy
Instrument, 92 OR. L. REV. 381, 385 (2013) (stating that “tort law and public
regulation are complements, not substitutes”).
23. See Alexandria B. Klass, CERCLA, State Law and Federalism in the 21st
Century, 41 SW. L. REV. 679, 680 (2012).
24. Abelkop, supra note 22, at 464; see also Lynda L. Butler, The Resilience
of Property, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 847, 887 (2013); Richard A. Epstein, Modern
Environmentalists Overreach: A Plea for Understanding Background Common
Law Principles, 37 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 3435 (2014).
25. See Chris Mooney, Trump Withdrew from the Paris Climate Deal a Year
Ago. Here’s What has Changed, WASH. POST (June 1, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2018/06/01/
trump-withdrew-from-the-paris-climate-plan-a-year-ago-heres-what-has-changed/
?noredirect=on&utm_term=.89f12c5a84fc (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (on file with
theWashingtonand Lee Law Review). See generally Nevitt & Percival, supra note
5.
26. See Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental
Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 130–33 (2005) (discussing problems with
environmental regulation and jurisdiction, noting that absence, form, and
enforcement of regulation pose difficulties).
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Government regulation may move at a snail’s pace.27 An agency
may be captured by the industry it is charged to regulate.28
Legislators may be in thrall to campaign contributors.29 The
plaintiffs may be powerless minorities who lack representation in
the legislature or a voice in the agency.30 Regulation has gaps;
examples are gasoline storage tanks and fracking.31 The regulatory
scheme may lack important remedies, compensatory damages,
punitive damages, restitution, and injunctions. “Regulation”
through common law courts’ civil injunctions may be flexible
enough to allow innovative solutions.32 In 2017, California coastal
communities filed climate-control actions for damages against
energy companies because of expected costs from rising sea
levels.33 In 2017 and 2018, Boulder, Colorado, New York City, and
other municipal governments prepared and filed climate-change
public nuisance, private nuisance, and trespass lawsuits against
27. See Stuart Shapiro, Why does it Take so Long to Issue a Regulation?, HILL
(May
19,
2015,
7:30
AM),
http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/theadministration/242468-why-does-it-take-so-long-to-issue-a-regulation
(last
visited Dec. 3, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
28. See Scott Hempling, “Regulatory Capture”: Sources and Solutions, 1
EMORY CORP. GOVERNANCE ACCOUNTABILITY & REV. 23, 24–25 (2014) (defining
regulatory capture as a situation in which the regulated entity “has more
influence than what the public interest requires”).
29. See Lynda W. Powell, The Influence of Campaign Contributions on the
Legislative Process, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 75, 100–01 (2014).
30. See Amber Phillips, The Striking Lack of Diversity in State Legislatures,
WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2016/01/26/the-real-problem-with-diversifying-congress-statelegislatures-are-even-less-diverse/?utm_term=.d68adaa7cc8a (last visited Dec. 3,
2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
31. See, e.g., Oil Pollution Prevention, 112 C.F.R. § 112 (2017) (providing
only regulation for spill prevention and response to spills); see also PUB. CITIZEN,
HYDRAULIC FRACTURING–UNSAFE, UNREGULATED 1–3 (2018), https://www.citizen.
org/sites/default/files/hydraulicfracturing_fs.pdf (describing that fracking poses
unregulated risks to drinking water).
32. See Abelkop, supra note 22, at 387; Stephen B Burbank, Sean Farhang
& Herbert M. Kritzer, Private Enforcement, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 637, 713
(2013); Klass, supra note 23, at 680.
33. Jenna Greene, New Tactic in Climate Control Litigation Could Cost
Energy Companies Billions. Or Not, RECORDER (July 20, 2017),
https://www.law.com/therecorder/almID/1202793545435/New-Tactic-in-ClimateChange-Litigation-Could-Cost-Energy-Companies-Billions-OrNot/?mcode=1202617583589&curindex=405 (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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energy companies.34 As Professor Sharkey wrote, common law
courts should “effectively incorporate input from federal agencies,
while at the same time ensuring that such agencies do not
overreach.”35
C. Rational Choices, Behavioral Economics, and Positive Law
This Article presents two perspectives for analyzing legal and
economic decision-making. On the one hand, a theory-driven
economic-analysis approach bases human decisions on economic
motives and often finds clear-cut answers.36 On the other hand, a
pragmatic and empirical view recognizes that human nature is
variable and that law is ambiguous and process driven.37 The rise
of behavioral economic scholarship has strengthened this
34. Eric Waeckerlin & Christopher Chrisman, Coming to Colorado—Climate
Change Nuisance Suits, HOLLAND & HART LLP (Jan. 29, 2018),
https://www.hollandhart.com/coming-to-colorado-climate-change-nuisance-suits
(last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
These lawsuits raise complex defensive, proof, and procedural issues that this
Article does not examine. Among them are standing, class action certification,
causation, public versus private nuisance, federal preemption and displacement.
See Good v. American Water Works Co., No. 2:14-01374, 2015 WL 3540509, at *3,
*8–10 (S.D. W. Va. June 4, 2015) (discussing economic loss rule and public-private
nuisance); Smith v. ConocoPhillips Pipe Line Co., 801 F.3d 921, 927 (8th Cir.
2015) (refusing a nuisance class action); Price v. Martin, 79 So. 3d 960, 977 (La.
2011) (refusing to certify state-court plaintiff class); Merrick v. Diageo Americas
Supply, 805 F.3d 685, 695 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding that the federal Clean Air Act
does not preempt state common law tort claims); Bell v. Cheswick Generating
Station, 734 F.3d 188, 197 (3d Cir. 2013) (finding that federal Clean Air Act did
not preempt state common law tort claims), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2696 (2014);
Freeman v. Grain Processing Corp., 848 N.W.2d 58, 94 (Iowa 2014) (finding that
federal Clean Air Act does not preempt state common law tort claims); American
Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 422–23 (2011) (stating that the
Clean Air Act displaces federal common law emissions-abatement lawsuit and
putting into question state lawsuits against pollution that originated outside its
borders); Anderson v. Teck Metals, Ltd., No. CV-13-420-LRS, 2015 WL 59100, at
*10 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 5, 2015) (finding that in a pollution lawsuit against a
Canadian defendant, CERCLA displaces federal common law public nuisance,
and that state public nuisance law was inapplicable outside the state).
35. Catherine M. Sharkey, The Administrative State and the Common Law:
Regulatory Substitutes or Compliments?, 65 EMORY L.J. 1705, 1734 (2016).
36. See Richard A. Posner, The Economic Approach to Law, 53 TEX. L. REV.
757, 762–67 (1975) (discussing economic theory and arguing that individuals
engage in predictable behavior regarding the law).
37. See SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY 256 (2011).

1868

75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1859 (2018)

approach. Differing basic ways of looking at the law emerge below.
How does human decision-making work? Taking my cue from
behavioral economic scholarship and earlier Legal Realists, Felix
Cohen38 and Leon Green,39 I argue that the pragmatic and
functional approach should supplement or replace theory.
The Cathedral article, which emphasized that it takes only
“one” view of the Cathedral, left room for other views.40 Judge
Calabresi’s 2016 book assimilates behavioral economics, another
view, and rejects dogmatic economic theory that elevates
micro-theory over law; his book favors economics that are flexible
enough to accept positive-law developments.41 Professor Hackney
maintains that then-professor Calabresi’s scholarship in the 1970s
was a precursor for behavioral economics.42 The Cathedral article
is more tentative and nuanced than many later more theory-driven
and dogmatic economic-analysis scholars.43 This Article follows
Judge Calabresi’s later work and refers to the theory-driven view
as economic analysis.
Although they have been supplemented by professionally
trained economists, the Cathedral article and other early law and
economics studies were written by economic autodidacts.44 Early
law-and-economics scholars emphasized a rational-choice
perspective.45 The rational-choice model holds that people make
38. See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 821–34 (1935).
39. See generally LEON GREEN, THE LITIGATION PROCESS IN TORT LAW (2d ed.
1977).
40. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1128.
41. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE FUTURE OF LAW & ECONOMICS: ESSAYS IN
REFORM AND RECOLLECTION 4–7 (2016) (endorsing behavioral economics, adding
that “there will be times when even an expanded economic theory will not be able
to explain legal reality”).
42. See James R. Hackney Jr., Guido Calabresi and the Construction of
Contemporary American Legal Theory, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 63–64
(2014) (asserting that Calabresi’s work reflects a trend towards a more
methodologically flexible approach to scholarship in the law-and-economics field).
43. This Article leaves out parts of the Cathedral article’s analysis; for
example, its discussion of the inalienable. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra
note 9, at 1111–15.
44. See Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and
Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L.
REV. 1033, 1083–84 (2012).
45. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV.
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planned and controlled decisions to advance their personal
economic utility.46
Economic-analysis scholarship seeks the most efficient way to
resolve a dispute.47 In contrast to most remedies scholarship, it
looks to the future through deterrence by signaling economic
incentives to a potential defendant to prevent future casualties and
to identify the lowest cost avoider.48 Deterrence is prospective not
retrospective. The seeker for deterrence may view the plaintiff’s
receipt of compensatory damages as almost incidental. Deterrence
is less connected to either the parties’ present litigation or to the
plaintiff’s actual or potential loss. It is more of a reason to take
money from the defendant than it is a reason to give the
defendant’s money to the plaintiff.
Court decisions, legal reasoning based on values, policies, and
legal rules, in contrast, usually examine money transfers from the
defendant to the plaintiff under the heading of compensation in
addition to lower-priority deterrence and punishment.49
Economic analysis’ vocabulary is difficult even for a specialist
to decode, what’s more a merely educated lawyer.50 It is too
abstruse for most lawyers and judges.51 And it is inaccessible, and
sometimes imperfectly applied.52 Written for a scholarly audience,
it may cloak a conservative political agenda that favors business
defendants over tort plaintiffs and de-emphasizes environmental
protection.
Contemporary behavioral economics, based on empirical
research, qualifies and rejects rational-choice theory:
Standard economics assumes that we are rational—that we
know all the pertinent information about our decisions, that we
1051, 1055 (2000).
46. See JONATHAN LEVIN & PAUL MILGROM, INTRODUCTION TO CHOICE THEORY
2–6 (2004), https://web.stanford.edu/~jdlevin/Econ%20202/Choice%20Theory.pdf.
47. See Posner, supra note 36, at 760.
48. Cf. Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Deterrence: The Legitimate Function of the
Public Tort, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1019, 1031–33 (2001).
49. See Samuel L. Bray, Remedies, Meet Economics; Economics, Meet
Remedies, 38 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 71, 72 (2018).
50. See Jeffrey Berryman, The Law of Remedies: A Prospectus for Teaching
and Scholarship, 10 OXFORD U. COMMONWEALTH L.J. 123, 130 (2010).
51. See id. at 130.
52. Id.
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can calculate the value of the different options we face, and that
we are cognitively unhindered in weighing the ramifications of
each potential choice. The result is that we are presumed to be
making logical and sensible decisions . . . . On the basis of these
assumptions, economists draw far-reaching conclusions about
everything from shopping trends to law to public policy.
But, . . . we are all far less rational in our decision making than
standard economic theory assumes . . . . So wouldn’t it make
sense to modify standard economics and move away from naive
psychology, which often fails the tests of reason, introspection,
and—most
importantly—empirical
scrutiny?
Wouldn’t
economics make a lot more sense if it were based on how people
actually behave, instead of how they should behave?53

People are not always rational maximizing machines. They
are emotional and error-prone cusses who often act contrary to
their own pecuniary self-interest.54 “Our species is not Homo
economicus. At the end of the day, it emerges as something more
complicated and interesting. We are Homo sapiens, imperfect
beings, soldiering on with conflicting impulses through an
unpredictable, implacably threatening world, doing our best with
what we have.”55 The behavioral limits on rational choice comprise
bounded rationality, bounded willpower, and bounded
self-interest.56
One behavioral legal economist insisted that “[t]he battle to
separate the economic analysis of legal rules and institutions from
the straightjacket of strict rational choice assumptions has been
won by the proponents of ‘behavioral law and economics.’”57
However, some readers’ reactions to a draft of this Article
showcased the durability of rational-choice sentiment.
“The purpose of studying economics[,]” English economist
Joan Robinson wrote, “is not to acquire a set of ready-made
answers to economic questions, but to learn how to avoid being

53. DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: REVISED AND EXPANDED EDITION:
THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR DECISIONS 317 (2009).
54. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 4 (2011).
55. EDWARD O. WILSON, THE SOCIAL CONQUEST OF EARTH 251 (2012).
56. See RICHARD H. THALER, MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS 258 (2015).
57. Russel Korobkin, What Comes After Victory for Behavioral Law and
Economics?, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1653, 1653 (2011).
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deceived by economists.”58 I am not a stranger to economic
analysis.59 Nevertheless, I agree with Professor Sterk’s
observation that “any attempt to justify legal rules exclusively in
efficiency terms is fatally flawed.”60
The major part of my analysis is common law, usually what
has happened in the courts throughout the land. One impediment
the legal scholar encounters is the vacuum that he must fill with
research. Theory-driven approaches, on the other hand, can state
the problem, turn the theory’s crank, and announce the result that
emerges. As Professor Douglas Laycock observed, “many
law-and-economics scholars,” who follow economic theory, exhibit
disinterest “in reading cases or mastering doctrine.”61 Research in
primary sources can be dull and frustrating, but it is indispensable
to responsible scholarship.
The United States has no single private-law court. Each state
and the District of Columbia has its own procedure, legal culture,
economy, and legal system with final appellate last-word in its own
supreme or other final court. Restatements, national treatises, and
scholarship in law reviews supply some uniformity. Terminology
varies within and between systems. By the time many of the
decisions under study reach appeal, the legal questions are close
enough to be decided either way. Moreover, judges write decisions
that support the result they reach. Courts, the researcher finds,
muddle through, often reaching contrasting and inconsistent
58. JOAN ROBINSON, MARX, MARSHALL AND KEYNES 30 (1955).
59. I co-authored one of the first law school applications of Tom Schelling’s
game theory; see Chapter 13 of OWEN M. FISS & DOUG RENDLEMAN, INJUNCTIONS
(2d ed. 1984), now Chapter 9 of DOUG RENDLEMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION:
INJUNCTIONS, STRUCTURAL REMEDIES, AND CONTEMPT (2010) (discussing the
injunction and its relation to game theory). Additional economic analysis can be
found in DOUG RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, REMEDIES 46–48 (discussing
lost earning capacity), 46–48 (discussing wrongful death damages), 68–69
(discussing pain and suffering damages), 116 (discussing the collateral source
rule), 360 (discussing the preliminary injunction standard), 722–25 (discussing
expectancy damages for breach of contract), 786–809 (discussing “efficient”
opportunistic breach of contract), 842–43 (discussing special-consequential
damages), 876–84 (discussing lost-volume sellers), 884–900 (discussing
liquidated damages) (9th ed. 2018).
60. Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV.
55, 104 (1987).
61. Douglas Laycock, The Neglected Defense of Undue Hardship (And the
Doctrinal Train Wreck in Boomer v. Atlantic Cement), 4 J. TORT L. 1, 20 (2012).
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decisions on similar facts.62 Research in appellate and some
trial-court decisions is imperfect and messy.
The positive-law writer must discover what the courts decide
in actual disputes. This requires him to find and read court
decisions, mostly appellate, which reflect the universe of disputes.
This research is difficult and imprecise. Its conclusions are often
tentative. The late Christopher Lasch observed that:
[W]e have writing in which theory, so-called, is allowed to set
the questions and determine the answers in advance. Theory,
so-called, has become the latest panacea, the latest source of
ready-made answers, the latest substitute for thought.
Thinking is hard work and often very frustrating, since it only
seems to yield provisional conclusions and to leave one in a
greater muddle than ever, and so intellectuals yearn to be
released from that burden, to find some secret formula that will
give them definitive, comforting answers and make it
unnecessary for them to go through this terrible labor of
thought.63

I have tried to find and analyze factually similar nuisance and
encroachment decisions. Several related bodies of tort, property,
environmental, and remedies law compete for the researcher’s
attention—mistaken improver, adverse possession, easements,
pollution control, and, if a government agency is involved, eminent
domain. I summarize decisions to illustrate and support my points.
II. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement
This Article turns to the archetype land-use dispute, Boomer
v. Atlantic Cement.64 Atlantic Cement’s factory was emitting
particulate pollution that distressed surrounding property
owners.65 What is neighbor Boomer to do? Although there were
multiple plaintiffs, for clarity and simplification, this Article
sometimes uses the singular for the plaintiff side of the lawsuit.
62. See John C. McCoid II, Inconsistent Judgments, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
487, 487 (1991) (describing how judges arrive at inconsistent opinions in lawsuits
containing identical issues).
63. Casey Blake & Christopher Phelps, History as Social Criticism:
Conversations with Christopher Lasch, 80 J. AM. HIST. 1310, 1324–25 (1994).
64. 257 N.E. 2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
65. Id. at 871–72.
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How should the court respond? An environmental tort is major
complex litigation with several substantive theories: nuisance,
trespass, negligence, strict liability, and violation of environmental
statutes, such as CERCLA.66 For clarity and simplification, this
Article focuses on nuisance and trespass.
The Boomer court accepted Atlantic Cement’s substantive tort
liability for a private nuisance.67 It focused on plaintiff Boomer’s
remedy.68 The court considered the utility of Atlantic Cement’s
development and the plant’s harm to plaintiff’s use and decided
that the plant had greater “value” than Boomer’s use of his
property.69 The court granted the “winning” plaintiff compensatory
damages instead of an injunction.70 “From the attempt to maintain
the sanctity of rights in property against social encroachment came
a de facto, but not de jure, damage remedy for injuries to rights in
land otherwise abatable by injunction,” my late colleague Professor
Louise Halper concluded.71
The court was influenced by the negative impact that
shuttering the factory would have on the local economy.72 As the
dissent points out, however, an injunction wouldn’t necessarily
have ended the defendant’s operation.73 The dissent also
emphasized the cement company’s power to take now and pay later
as well as the pollution’s deleterious effect on public health.74
The New York Court of Appeals’ Boomer decision has held its
law school audience for generations.75 First-year Property and
Torts casebooks feature Boomer as a principal case along with
66. See Klass, supra note 23, at 693–94 (explaining that on a theory of
negligence per se, courts “have used federal, state, and local environmental
statutes and regulations to help define the duty of care and to serve as a basis for
liability”).
67. See Boomer, 257 N.E. 2d at 871.
68. See id. at 871–75.
69. See id.
70. Id. at 875.
71. Louise A. Halper, Untangling the Nuisance Knot, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 89, 130 (1998).
72. See Boomer, 257 N.E. 2d at 872.
73. Id. at 877 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 875–77 (Jasen, J., dissenting).
75. See Daniel A. Farber, The Story of Boomer: Pollution and the Common
Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 7, 8 (Oliver A. Houck & Richard J. Lazarus
eds., 2005).
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Spur Industries, which is discussed below.76 Because of the court’s
choice between damages and an injunction in environmental
litigation, Boomer is also a natural teaching case for upper-level

76. For property casebooks with Boomer and Spur as principal cases, see
JOHN E. CRIBBET, ROGER W. FINDLEY, ERNEST E. SMITH & JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI,
PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 679–88 (9th ed. 2008) (presenting Boomer and
Spur); JESSE DUKEMINIER, JAMES E. KRIER, GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, MICHAEL H.
SCHILL & LIOR JACOB STRAHILEVITZ, PROPERTY 742–58 (9th ed. 2018) (presenting
the cases in what is probably the most widely used casebook); THOMAS W. MERRILL
& HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 965–83 (3rd ed. 2012)
(presenting Boomer and Spur). However, one casebook summarizes Boomer and
Spur in Notes and names the injunction and damages as possible remedies. See
DAVID L. CALLIES, DANIEL R. MANDELKER, & J. GORDON HYLTON, PROPERTY LAW
AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: CASES AND MATERIALS 153–54 (4th ed. 2016). For torts
casebooks containing either case, see GEORGE C. CHRISTIE, JOSEPH SANDERS & W.
JONATHAN CARDI, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 1230–40 (5th ed.
2012) (presenting Boomer as a principal case, with Spur in the notes); RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN & CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 612 (11th ed.
2016) (presenting Boomer as a principal case); MARC A. FRANKLIN, ROBERT L.
RABIN, MICHAEL D. GREEN & MARK A. GEISTFELD, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES
688–702 (10th ed. 2016) (presenting Boomer as a principal case, with Spur in the
notes); JOHN C. P. GOLDBERG, ANTHONY J. SEBOK & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORT
LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 866 (4th ed. 2016) (beginning presentation of
Boomer); VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVID F. PARTLETT, PROSSER,
WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 867–77 (13th ed. 2015)
(presenting Boomer and Spur as principal cases).
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courses in Remedies77 and Environmental Law.78 Scholars have
written important chapters and leading articles about the
remedies issues in Boomer.79
77. See Candace S. KOVACIC-FLEISCHER, JEAN C. LOVE & GRANT S. NELSON,
EQUITABLE REMEDIES, RESTITUTION AND DAMAGES: CASES AND MATERIALS 803–23
(8th ed. 2011) (presenting Boomer and Spur as principal cases); GEORGE KUNEY,
EXPERIENCING REMEDIES 482–88 (2015) (presenting Boomer); DOUGLAS LAYCOCK
& RICHARD L. HASEN, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 419– 22
(5th ed. 2019) (presenting Boomer and Spur in note discussions); DOUG
RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS 1208–15
(9th ed. 2018) (presenting Boomer as a principal case, referencing Spur in the
notes); EMILY SHERWIN & SAMUEL L. BRAY, AMES, CHAFEE, AND RE ON REMEDIES:
CASES AND MATERIALS 478–87 (2nd ed. 2018) (Boomer and Spur presented as
principal cases); ELAINE W. SHOBEN, WILLIAM MURRAY TABB, RACHEL M. JANUTIS
& THOMAS ORIN MAIN, REMEDIES: CASES AND PROBLEMS 88–94, 410–11 (6th ed.
2016) (presenting Boomer, with Spur in the notes); TRACY A. THOMAS, DAVID I.
LEVINE & DAVID J. JUNG, REMEDIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 137–38 (6th ed. 2017)
(referencing Boomer within Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Property Co., 966 F.2d
273 (7th Cir. 1992)); RUSSELL L. WEAVER, DAVID F. PARTLETT, MICHAEL B. KELLY
& W. JONATHAN CARDI, REMEDIES: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 330–40 (4th ed.
2016) (presenting Boomer and Spur in section on experimental and conditional
injunctions); see also DOUG RENDLEMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: INJUNCTIONS,
STRUCTURAL REMEDIES, AND CONTEMPT 178–94 (2010) (presenting Boomer, with
Spur in the notes). The Torts and Property courses at Washington and Lee and
many other law schools have been attenuated to four credit hours each. I have
sometimes found in my upper-level Remedies class that none of the students have
covered Boomer in their first year of law school, a pity.
78. ROBERT PERCIVAL, CHRISTOPHER H. SCHROEDER, ALAN S. MILLER & JAMES
P. LEAPE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 79–80 (8th ed.
2018) (including Boomer as part of a discussion on private nuisance written to
maintain that private nuisance is “grossly inadequate” for addressing modern
industrial pollution). This Article, on the other hand, maintains that private
nuisance has a role in dealing with pollution.
79. See, e.g., Daniel Farber, Reassessing Boomer: Justice, Efficiency, and
Nuisance Law, in PROPERTY LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
JOHN E. CRIBBET 7, 17 (Peter Hay & Michael H. Hoeflich eds., 1988); Daniel A.
Farber, The Story of Boomer: Pollution and the Common Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW STORIES 7, 20, 22, 23 (Oliver A. Houck & Richard J. Lazarus eds., 2005); W.
Page Keeton & Clarence Morris, Notes on “Balancing the Equities”, 18 TEX. L.
REV. 412, 412–25 (1940); Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in
the Age of the Regulatory State, 92 IOWA L. REV. 545, 571–76 (2007); Laycock,
supra note 61, at 1–2; John P. S. McLaren, The Common Law Nuisance Actions
and the Environmental Battle—Well-Tempered Swords or Broken Reeds?, 10
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 505, 547 (1972); A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance
Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L.
REV. 1075, 1075 (1980); Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1719, 1719–21 (2004); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in
the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 974–75 (2004) (discussing
information-cost theory, compensatory damages, compensated injunctions, and

1876

75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1859 (2018)

Boomer, Professor Farber concludes, lives on in law school
because it is “a great teaching tool . . . . Generations of law
students have wondered whether, in this battle between David and
Goliath, Goliath should walk away so apparently unscathed,
leaving a battered David with nothing but a few coins for his
trouble.”80 However, many scholars, law teachers, and other
observers, including many Washington and Lee law students,
favor the Boomer court’s damages-only remedy, a position that this
Article reprobates.81 For my pedagogical purposes, however, the
Boomer decision performs an important service because the
teaching value of a simple, but faulty, decision is clear.82
The reason Professor Laycock refers to the Boomer decision as
a “train wreck” is that the Court of Appeals rewrote doctrinal
history without acknowledging that it had.83 The court started
with the inaccurate premise that the New York common law of
nuisance remedies required a judge to grant a nuisance plaintiff
an injunction when the plaintiff’s loss from the defendant’s activity
was “substantial.”84 Thus, if the plaintiff’s loss surmounted that
minimum threshold, the judge would grant an injunction without
considering what it cost the defendant to abate the nuisance.85 The
Boomer court claimed an innovation for its decision to compare
plaintiffs’ benefit from an injunction, which it stated as permanent
the exclusion regime); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property:
Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1742 (2007)
(employing information-cost theory to compare “the more tort-like copyright
regime and the more property-like patent law”); Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Uncertainty About Property Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285,
1285 (2008); John W. Wade, Environmental Protection, The Common Law of
Nuisance and the Restatement of Torts, 8 F., ABA SECT. INSURANCE, NEGLIGENCE,
& COMPENSATION L. 165, 174 (1972); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Note, Injunction
Negotiations: An Economic, Moral, and Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1563,
1563 (1975) (discussing negotiations regarding property right enforcement in the
form of injunctions and the contempt proceedings that may follow); Comment,
Internalizing Externalities: Nuisance Law and Economic Efficiency, 53 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 219, 219–20 (1978) (discussing economic efficiency and nuisance law with
reference to Boomer).
80. Farber, supra note 75, at 42.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. Laycock, supra note 61, at 7–8.
84. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 872 (N.Y. 1970).
85. See id.
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damages of $185,000 with defendant’s cost to comply with a
shutdown injunction, closing a $45,000,000 plant and dismissing
over 300 workers.86
As Professor Halper demonstrated in 1990, however, the
Boomer decision was really nothing new for New York.87 The
Boomer court had overlooked a “large body of [New York] law on
undue hardship.”88 “Boomer was no innovation,” Laycock also
concluded in 2012 after he “independently reviewed” Halper’s
research and “further confirmed her general account.”89
This Article will, in addition, criticize the Boomer decision
below as badly reasoned and incorrectly decided.
A. Pollution, Nuisance, and Trespass
Should a property owner like Boomer, who lives on the edge of
an industrial site, be subjected to the health hazards and
uncompensated property depreciation caused by a cement factory’s
particulate pollution? The factory’s operation interferes with the
owner’s enjoyment, indeed his possession, of his land.
In economists’ parlance, an industrial proprietor’s negative
externality is the incidental harmful effect that its activity has on
others, an effect that the proprietor is not legally responsible for
and may ignore.90 A negative externality means that the proprietor
has captured the benefits of its operation while distributing some
of its costs to others.91
A court may create legal responsibility for the proprietor’s
activity and define remedial consequences that force it to consider
the affected property owners.92 The court’s remedial decision will
structure the proprietor’s incentives to “internalize the
86. See id. at 873 n.*.
87. Louise A. Halper, Nuisance, Courts and Markets in the New York Court
of Appeals, 1850–1915, 54 ALB. L. REV. 301, 302 (1990).
88. Laycock, supra note 61, at 10.
89. Id. at 8, 10 n.46.
90. See
Negative
Externality,
FUNDAMENTAL
FINANCE,
http://economics.fundamentalfinance.com/negative-externality.php (last visited
Dec. 3, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
91. Id.
92. See J. William Futrell, The Transition to Sustainable Development Law,
21 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 192 (2003).
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externality.”93 Courts have used nuisance and trespass substantive
law and injunction and damages remedies to constrain neighbors’
nuisances and trespasses and to suppress externalities.94
A landowner plaintiff sues a defendant for a nuisance to
protect his right to use and enjoy his property. Nuisance involves
less-palpable invasions, for example a defendants’ noise, odor, and
vibrations.95 Courts adopted nuisance as the private-law
foundation for modern environmental law.96 Most decisions
discussed below are nuisance-based. A legal researcher will find
the substantive law of private nuisance a puzzle.97 Both
Restatements of Torts will cause more puzzlement.98
Trespass to land is a related tort that blends into the tort of
nuisance.99 A trespass involves a defendant casting something
with size and weight that impinges on the plaintiff landowner’s
land.100 Many of the decisions we review below stemmed from
defendants’ encroachments on plaintiffs’ property. A court will use

93. Id.
94. See id. at 192 n.37.
95. See DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF
TORTS: PRACTITIONER TREATISE SERIES § 402 (2d ed. 2011).
96. See id. § 398. See generally Nevitt & Percival, supra note 5.
97. See William L. Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEX. L. REV. 399, 410
(1942) (referring to nuisance as a “legal garbage can”). In the fourth edition of his
Torts treatise, mellowed by the intervening years, Prosser said that nuisance was
merely an “impenetrable jungle.” WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS 571 (4th ed. 1971). Confirmation for these conclusions will be found in John
W. Wade, Environmental Protection, The Common Law of Nuisance and the
Restatement of Torts, 8 F., ABA SECT. OF INSURANCE, NEGLIGENCE, &
COMPENSATION L. 165, 170–72 (1972) (describing the complex evolution of private
nuisance law), and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (AM. LAW INST.
1979).
98. Professor Halper explained why this puzzlement occurs in Louise A.
Halper, Untangling the Nuisance Knot. See Halper, supra note 71, at 119–28, 130
(considering the Restatement in light of the assertion that nuisance is
unprincipled); see also Farber, supra note 75, at 10–13. Professor Fraley
maintains that the Second Restatement of Torts’ negligence approach to nuisance
was a mistake. See Jill Fraley, Liability for Unintentional Nuisances 1 (Wash. &
Lee Pub. Legal Stud. Res. Paper Series No. 2018-14, 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3216539
(forthcoming
publication in the West Virginia Law Review).
99. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 95, § 51.
100. Id. § 57.
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the trespass tort to protect the owner’s right to use and possess the
land and its physical integrity.101
Although Boomer might have characterized Atlantic’s
migrating particulates as trespasses, the plaintiff’s substantive
theory in Boomer was nuisance, based on the factory’s particulates,
as less tangible invasions than the explicit invasion of trespass.102
Nuisance is a more complex substantive tort than trespass because
the court compares the litigants’ uses.103 A court will treat a
nuisance defendant better and more leniently in both substance
and remedy than a trespass defendant.104 This leads creative
plaintiffs’ lawyers to develop interesting trespass-tort
characterizations that test the borderline between the two torts to
achieve favorable treatment for their clients.105
In a decision finding that projecting a critical message onto a
building wasn’t a trespass, a Nevada court’s “review of trespass
law in other jurisdictions reveals two lines of cases. Jurisdictions
that adhere to the traditional rule of trespass hold a trespass only
occurs ‘where the invasion of land occurs through a physical,
tangible object.’”106 The decision continued that “[j]urisdictions
that adhere to the modern theory hold that a trespass may also
occur when intangible matter, such as particles emanating from a
manufacturing plant, cause actual and/or substantial damage to
the res (sic.).”107 Particulate pollution from a defendant’s dust,
smoke, and gas might fit into either tort.108
In Oregon in 1960, for example, a court held that a defendant
who disseminated particulates and gasses with fluorides had
101. Id. § 52.
102. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., Inc., 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y.
1970).
103. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 95, § 51.
104. See id. at 133.
105. See id. at 134.
106. Int’l Union of Painters & Allied Trades Dist. Council 15 Local 159 v.
Great Wash Park, LLC, No. 67453, 2016 WL 4499940, at *2 (Nev. App. Aug. 18,
2016) (quoting Babb v. Lee Cty. Landfill SC, LLC, 747 S.E.2d 468, 477 (S.C.
2013)).
107. Id. at *2. Judge Tao wrote in a concurring opinion that the two torts
overlap: “[E]xpanding the tort of trespass to cover such things as light, gas, or
odors effectively blurs the two torts together and makes them one.” Id. at *7 (Tao,
J., concurring).
108. See id. at *7 (Tao, J., concurring).
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committed a trespass.109 In 2011, a Minnesota state intermediate
appellate court found that defendant’s over-sprayed pesticides that
drifted from its field to an organic farmer’s field were a trespass
and that an injunction was a possible remedy.110 In 2012, however,
the state supreme court held that the invasion of defendant’s
drifting pesticide wasn’t a trespass because the pesticide wasn’t a
tangible item that invaded plaintiffs’ land and interfered with
their possession of it.111 But the court said that defendant’s
invading pesticide could be a nuisance remedied by an injunction
because it interfered with plaintiffs’ ability to use their land.112
There are numerous decisions on both sides.113
B. The Permanent-Temporary Distinction
Courts classify a defendant’s nuisance or trespass invasion of
a plaintiff’s land as permanent or temporary.114 This must include
the important caveat that “[t]he terms ‘permanent’ and ‘temporary’
109. See Martin v. Reynolds Metals Co., 342 P.2d 790, 797 (1959) (stating that
a “defendant’s conduct in causing chemical substances to be deposited upon the
plaintiffs’ land fulfilled all of the requirements under the law of trespass”), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 918 (1960).
110. See Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Coop. Oil Co., 802 N.W.2d
383, 392 (Minn. App. 2011), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 817 N.W.2d 693 (Minn.
2012).
111. See Johnson v. Paynesville Farmers Union Coop. Oil Co., 817 N.W.2d
693, 714 (Minn. 2012).
112. See id. at 705. The Minnesota litigation may be a harbinger of litigation
about dicamba, an herbicide for genetically modified soybeans and cotton that
drifts when sprayed above ground and damages unmodified crops, including an
estimated 3.6 million acres of soybeans. See Eric Lipton, Crops in 25 States
Damaged by Unintended Drift of Weed Killer, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/01/business/soybeans-pesticide.html
(last
visited Dec. 3, 2018) (elaborating on the damage done by the weed killer dicamba)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). In addition to farmers and
farm groups, environmental groups, the federal EPA, pesticide and chemical
companies, and state and local regulators are concerned about the herbicide. See
id.
113. See Babb v. Lee Cty. Landfill, LLC, 747 S.E.2d 468, 480 (S.C. 2013)
(finding that physical invasion is required for trespass, not odor); Larry D.
Schaefer, Annotation, Recovery in Trespass for Injury to Land Caused by Airborne
Pollutants, 2 A.L.R. 4th 1054 (1980 & Cumulative Supp.) (collecting decisions on
both sides).
114. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 95, § 57.
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are somewhat nebulous in that they have practical meaning only
in relation to particular fact situations and can change in
characterization from one set of facts to another.”115
The permanent-temporary distinction governs four issues: the
applicable statute of limitations,116 the choice between (or
combination of) damages and an injunction, the measure of
damages, and the definition of a cause of action for preclusion.117
We are primarily concerned here with the plaintiff’s remedies, the
court’s choice between, or combination of, damages and an
injunction and with the measure of the plaintiff’s damages.
If the court classifies the defendant’s invasion of the plaintiff’s
property as permanent, the landowner’s single cause of action
accrued and the statute of limitations period commenced to run
when the defendant’s invasion began or when the plaintiff’s injury
became apparent.118 If the statute of limitations period has
expired, the owner’s suit against the defendant’s permanent
invasion is time-barred.119
If the plaintiff’s lawsuit against the defendant’s permanent
invasion isn’t time barred, the landowner has one cause of action
for past and future damages.120 The court will measure a successful
plaintiff’s permanent damages by diminution, the value that the
plaintiff’s property lost because of the defendant’s invasion.121 By
paying the plaintiff his permanent damages, the defendant
acquires something like an easement or servitude on the plaintiff’s

115. Mel Foster Co. Props. v. American Oil Co., 427 N.W.2d 171, 175 (Iowa
1988) (quoting Note, Stream Pollution—Recovery of Damages, 50 IOWA L. REV.
141, 153 (1964)); see also DOBBS ET AL., supra note 95, § 57.
116. See Burley v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 273 P.3d 825, 844 (Mont.
2012).
117. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 95, § 57.
118. See Burley, 273 P.3d at 827.
119. See DAN B. DOBBS & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, LAW OF REMEDIES:
DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 5.11(1) (3d ed. 2018); see also Bethpage Water
Dist. v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 884 F.3d 118, 125 (2d Cir. 2018) (stating that
the “limitation only applies to claims for damages, not claims for injunctive
relief”); Forest Lakes Cmty. Ass’n v. United Land Corp. of Am., 795 S.E.2d 875,
881–82 (Va. 2017) (evaluating plaintiff’s damages claim for statute of limitations
purposes and holding that the accrual of permanent nuisance and trespass
occurred when the injury began).
120. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 95, § 57.
121. See Forest, 795 S.E. 2d at 883 n.12.
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property.122 The defendant, moreover, exercises something like
eminent domain over the plaintiff’s property.123
The New York court’s remedy for plaintiff Boomer was, in
effect, permanent damages. The court’s conditional injunction
formally enjoined Atlantic Cement’s nuisance, but the court stayed
its injunction, apparently for eighteen months; the injunction
would never become effective if defendant paid plaintiff’s damages
which in turn created an easement.124
A defendant’s temporary invasion is divided into two
subdivisions: the defendant’s repeated invasions or its continuing
invasion of the plaintiff’s property.125 Each day of a defendant’s
temporary invasion of the plaintiff’s land is a self-contained cause
of action for statute-of-limitations purposes.126 The owner may sue
the defendant to recover for his temporary damages that occurred
during the statute-of-limitations period immediately preceding his
lawsuit.127
Instead of damages, the owner’s future remedy for the
defendant’s continuing trespass is often an injunction that orders
the defendant to either cease or ameliorate its tort.128 The court
may couple a future-oriented injunction with awarding the
plaintiff a rental-value measure of damages for the defendant’s
past invasions.129 A court is more likely to measure a plaintiff’s
temporary damages by the cost to restore the land or by the land’s
rental value than by its diminution in value.130 If the judge doesn’t
grant the plaintiff an injunction, the plaintiff may, in the future,
sue the defendant in a second action for his damages that occurred
after the first judgment.131 This was the trial judge’s decision in
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement that the Court of Appeals reversed.132

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 95, § 57.
See id. at 153.
See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E. 2d 870, 873–75 (N.Y. 1970).
See Hoery v. United States, 64 P.3d 214, 222 (Colo. 2003).
See id. at 223.
See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 95, § 57.
See id. § 57, at 154 n.9.
See id. § 404, at 647.
See id. § 57, at 155.
See id. § 57, at 154.
See Boomer, 257 N.E. 2d at 871.

REHABILITATING THE NUISANCE INJUNCTION

1883

C. Economics and the Environment
Two of the reasons Professor Halper gave for nuisance’s legal
and economic complexity are prominent in Boomer: How, first,
should a court adopt the common law of nuisance to the forces of
economic development?133 A landowner-plaintiff who relies on the
traditional torts of nuisance and trespass may be a conservative
property-rights opponent of industrial progress.134 Second, what
role does the public interest in a wholesome environment play?135
The plaintiff may also be a progressive paladin fighting to protect
the environment.
The Boomer court’s minimalist opinion emphasized economic
development and subordinated the larger public issue of
environmental control:
A court performs its essential function when it decides the
rights of parties before it . . . . It is a rare exercise of judicial
power to use a decision in private litigation as a purposeful
mechanism to achieve direct public objectives greatly beyond
the rights and interests presently before the court.
Effective control of air pollution is a problem presently far from
solution even with the full public and financial powers of
government . . . . It seems apparent that the amelioration of air
pollution will depend on technical research in great depth; on a
carefully balanced consideration of the economic impact of close
regulation; and of the actual effect on public health. It is likely
to require massive public expenditure and to demand more than
any local community can accomplish and to depend on regional
and interstate controls.
A court should not try to do this on its own as a by-product of
private litigation and it seems manifest that the judicial
establishment is neither equipped in the limited nature of any
judgment it can pronounce nor prepared to lay down and
implement an effective policy for the elimination of air
pollution. This is an area beyond the circumference of one
private lawsuit. It is a direct responsibility for government and
should not thus be undertaken as an incident to solving a

133. See Halper, supra note 71, at 91.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 102 (quoting John P.S. McLaren, Nuisance Law and the
Industrial Revolution: Some Lessons from Social History, 3 OXFORD J. LEG. STUD.
155, 161 (1983)).
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dispute between property owners and a single cement plant—
one of many—in the Hudson River valley.136

The court added that the “public health or other public
agencies” are not foreclosed from “seeking proper relief.”137 These
authorities have diligently pursued efforts to reduce pollution and
clean up the air.138 Cement plants continue to be heavily regulated
industries.139 Private plaintiffs’ nuisance litigation continues
apace along with the public environmental regulatory law that
legislatures have developed in the meantime.140
A counterbalancing decision also from the early years of the
environmental era was Harrison v. Indiana Auto Shredders.141
Defendant appealed from plaintiffs’ judgment in a neighbors’
nuisance lawsuit against defendant’s huge automobile shredder.142
The Court of Appeals was due to reverse the trial judge because
the judge’s remedy, permanent damages plus a shut-down
injunction, was duplicative and overreaching.143
Writing for the United States Court of Appeals, Justice Tom
Clark dealt with several features of the common-law technique and
environmental law in ways that contrast with the Boomer court:
This case is representative of the new breed of lawsuit spawned
by the growing concern for cleaner air and water. The birth and
burgeoning growth of environmental litigation have forced the
courts into difficult situations where modern hybrids of the
traditional concepts of nuisance law and equity must be
fashioned. Nuisance has always been a difficult area for the
courts . . . . E]nvironmental consciousness may be the saving
prescript for our age. Thus the right of environmentallyaggrieved parties to obtain redress in the courts serves as a
necessary and valuable supplement to legislative efforts to
restore the natural ecology of our cities and countryside.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E. 2d 870, 871 (N.Y. 1970).
Id. at 873.
See Farber, supra note 75, at 15.
See PORTLAND CEMENT ASS’N, OVERVIEW IMPACT OF EXISTING AND
PROPOSED REGULATORY STANDARDS ON DOMESTIC CEMENT CAPACITY 1 (2011),
http://www2.cement.org/econ/pdf/impacteparegs22011.pdf.
140. See Farber, supra note 75, at 11.
141. See Harrison v. Ind. Auto Shredders Co., 528 F.2d 1107, 1109 (7th Cir.
1975).
142. See id.
143. See id. at 1127.
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Judicial involvement in solving environmental problems does,
however, bring its own hazards. Balancing the interests of a
modern urban community . . . may be very difficult. Weighing
the desire for economic and industrial strength against the need
for clean and livable surroundings is not easily done, especially
because of the gradations in quality as well as quantity that are
involved. There is the danger that environmental problems will
be inadequately treated by the piecemeal methods of litigation.
It is possible that courtroom battles may be used to slow down
effective policymaking for the environment. Litigation often
fails to provide sufficient opportunities for the expert analysis
and broad perspective that such policymaking often requires.
As difficult as environmental balancing may be, however, some
forum for aggrieved parties must be made available. If
necessary, the courts are qualified to perform the task. The
courts are skilled at “balancing the equities,” a technique that
traditionally has been one of the judicial functions. Courts are
insulated from the lobbying that gives strong advantages to
industrial polluters when they face administrative or legislative
review of their operations. The local state or federal court,
because of its proximity to the individual problem, is often in a
better position to judge the effect of a pollution nuisance upon a
locality. For all of these reasons, the balancing in this case,
although difficult, was nonetheless a proper function for the
court below to perform. All other forums for obtaining relief
were cut-off from the claimants and they understandably
turned to the courts for relief.144

I endorse Professor Klass’s unfavorable contrast of the Boomer
court’s to the Harrison court’s attitudes and approaches to the
judicial role in applying common-law doctrines to develop a remedy
for a large environmental problem.145
Similarly, Professor Farber questioned whether the Boomer
majority’s “balancing” weighed everything relevant to its
decision.146 He pointed out that the majority considered the cement
plant’s investment and its employees, but that it ignored the
deleterious effect of the factory’s pollution on the health of the

144. Id. at 1120–21.
145. See Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalism in the Age of the
Regulatory State, 92 IOWA L. REV. 545, 571–76 (2007); see also Henry E. Smith,
Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1733–34 (2004).
146. See Farber, supra note 75, at 20.
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people in the vicinity.147 The court, he wrote, “refers to one
third-party interest favoring the defendant—the number of
employees at the plant—but it ignores the third-party interest
favoring the plaintiff, the regional impact of the defendant’s air
pollution.”148 Denying plaintiff Boomer an injunction and remitting
him to permanent damages downgraded public health.149 Favoring
awarding Boomer diminution damages over granting him an
injunction means forcing him, in effect, to exchange his health for
the defendant’s money.150 Mr. Bill Futrell concluded that the
Boomer majority incorrectly subordinated the injunction to
damages and “vitiated the law of private nuisance.”151
The public interest would have been better served if the
Boomer court had chosen different remedies.152 The New York
court under-valued the injunction and overlooked the public health
and the environment.153 The court should have enjoined, ordering
the harmful activity modified or stopped.154 Instead of
compensatory damages, the court, as will be discussed below,
might have awarded damages for past injury and ordered a
“standards” injunction that required the cement company to install
and maintain available pollution-control technology.155
Laycock, who faults the Boomer court’s “terrible opinion,”
reached a different conclusion about its result.156 He agreed with
the court’s choice of a damages remedy.157 The Boomer court, he
wrote, reached an “entirely predictable result” through historical

147. See id.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 24.
150. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E. 2d 870, 876 (N.Y. 1970)
(Jasen, J., dissenting).
151. J. William Futrell, The Transition to a Sustainable Development Law, 21
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 192–93 (2003); see also Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient
Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17 (1989) (considering the likelihood of
receiving an injunction in a Boomer-style case).
152. See Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 875–76 (N.Y. 1970) (Jasen, J., dissenting).
153. See id. at 877 (Jasen, J. dissenting).
154. See id. (Jasen, J. dissenting).
155. See id. (Jasen, J. dissenting).
156. Laycock, supra note 61, at 7–19.
157. See id. at 33 (noting the “wisdom” of the “undue hardship defense,” a
defense that Laycock believes was utilized, albeit poorly, by Boomer).
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and analytical error.158 Because of the disparity in values, the
choice the court saw for itself between a shut-down injunction and
damages is a close one that may favor damages.159 In my judgment,
the choice discussed below between a standards injunction and
damages favors a standards injunction.
D. The Common Law, Judgment, and Discretion
The court decides the defendant’s liability first, then whether
to grant a plaintiff any remedy.160 The court makes two decisions
about a successful plaintiff’s remedy: (1) it chooses which remedy
and (2) it measures-defines the chosen remedy.161 An economist
might state these important decisions as whether a defendant’s
activity is an externality and, if so, whether and how the defendant
will internalize its externality.
The court’s major choice of remedy for a defendant’s pollution
is between compensatory damages and an injunction.162 After the
court chooses the plaintiff’s remedy, it decides how to measure or
define it, the amount of damages and the injunction’s terms.163 The
court’s discretion in choosing a plaintiff’s remedy is more
circumscribed than its discretion in measuring-defining it.164 After
the judge decides to grant the plaintiff an injunction, her discretion
increases when considering the injunction’s terms.165
The New York Court of Appeals decided Boomer under the
court-made common law tort of nuisance.166 A court applying the
158. Id. at 7.
159. See id. at 35.
160. DOUG RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, REMEDIES 1 (9th ed. 2018).
161. Id. at 1–2.
162. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 95, § 404, at 644.
163. See id. at 649.
164. See Doug Rendleman, The Triumph of Equity Revisited: The Stages of
Equitable Discretion, 15 NEV. L.J. 1397, 1434–38, 1449, 1451 (2015); Doug
Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s Equitable Discretion Following eBay v.
MercExchange, 27 REV. LITIG. 63, 93 (2007).
165. See Doug Rendleman, The Triumph of Equity Revisited: The Stages of
Equitable Discretion, 15 NEV. L.J. 1397, 1434–38, 1449, 1451 (2015); Doug
Rendleman, The Trial Judge’s Equitable Discretion Following eBay v.
MercExchange, 27 REV. LITIG. 63, 93–94 (2007).
166. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E. 2d 870, 871 (N.Y. 1970).
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common law to a dispute that isn’t controlled by a precedent
literally creates the law as it consults existing similar decisions to
decide both the substance and the successful plaintiff’s remedy.167
Does the judge have discretion to find that a defendant
violated the plaintiff’s substantive right, to decline to grant the
plaintiff an injunction, and to substitute money damages for the
plaintiff’s property right? A negative answer and a minority view
came from Professors Kraus and Coleman: “It is surely odd to claim
that an individual’s right is protected when another individual is
permitted to force a transfer at a price set by third parties. Isn’t
the very idea of a forced transfer contrary to the autonomy or
liberty thought constitutive of rights?”168
Professor Plater articulated the majority approach that
approves a common-law court’s flexibility in choosing a plaintiff’s
remedy.169 He wrote that in a non-statutory lawsuit governed by
court-made common-law rules, the judge may find that the
defendant violated the substantive rule yet not grant an injunction
because “abatement was decided anew in each case.”170 “An
injunction,” the Supreme Court said in 2008, emphasizing Plater’s
point, “is a matter of equitable discretion; it does not follow from
success on the merits as a matter of course.”171 The judge has
discretion to find the defendant liable for a tort, but to decline to
grant the plaintiff an injunction and instead award him
damages.172
In a statutory decision, Weinberger v. Romero–Barcelo,173 the
Supreme Court cited the New York court’s common-law decision in

167. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 177 (1991).
168. Jules L. Coleman & Jody Kraus, Rethinking the Theory of Legal Rights,
95 YALE L.J. 1335, 1338–39 (1986).
169. See Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable Discretion,
70 CAL. L. REV. 524, 543 (1982).
170. Id. In contrast, Plater wrote that a court dealing with a provision in a
constitution or a statute starts with a baseline premise that may circumscribe its
discretion. See id. at 525–26 (“[A] court has no discretion or authority to exercise
equitable powers so as to permit violations of statutes to continue.”).
171. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 32 (2008).
172. See Boomer, 257 N.E. 2d at 871–75; Brown v. Voss, 715 P.2d 514, 518
(Wash. 1986).
173. 456 U.S. 305 (1982).
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Boomer as well as an Arizona common-law decision174 that this
Article discusses below to illustrate the judge’s equitable
discretion.175 Professor Farber wrote in 2005 that “[u]nfortunately,
the Supreme Court has done little to clarify the availability of
environmental injunctions in the twenty years since Weinberger,
so we still cannot be completely certain about the extent to which
Boomer carries over to statutory injunctions.”176 The common-law
Boomer court drew on its equitable discretion to deny plaintiff an
injunction that would forbid an activity that the court conceded is
improper.177 “Despite its approving citation of Boomer,” Farber
speculates, “the Weinberger Court probably did not mean to
endorse open-ended judicial discretion.”178 Because the Supreme
Court has not revisited equitable discretion since Weinberger, we
continue to lack a definitive answer.179
III. Calabresi and Melamed’s One View of the Cathedral
Since the 1970s, the early days of law-and-economics
scholarship, economic-analysis scholars have discussed the New
York court’s choice in Boomer between damages and an injunction
under the rubric of liability rule versus property rule, the
vocabulary in the famous Cathedral article.180 Tours of the
Cathedral are a “cottage industry” in the law reviews.181 These
discussions occupy a major corner of economic-analysis
scholarship.182
174. Spur Indus. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 108 Ariz. 178 (1972).
175. See Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 326 n.7 (1982); Doug Rendleman, The
Triumph of Equity Revisited: The Stages of Equitable Discretion, 15 NEV. L.J.
1397, 1426–28 (2015).
176. Farber, supra note 75, at 29.
177. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E. 2d 870, 873 (N.Y. 1970).
178. Farber, supra note 75, at 29.
179. Id.
180. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1105–06 n.34.
181. WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR THINKING ABOUT
THE LAW 193 (2007).
182. Several critical articles accept its basic structure but suggest
refinements. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Uncertainty About Property Rights, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1285, 1290 (2008); Frank I.
Michelman, “There Have to Be Four”, 64 MD. L. REV. 136, 140 (2005).
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The Cathedral article presented a court like the Boomer court
with four possible solutions or “Rules.”183 Rule 1 is a “property
rule.”184 The court finds that a nuisance exists; the plaintiff
prevails on the defendant’s nuisance.185 Then the court grants the
plaintiff an injunction closing the defendant’s factory.186 Rule 2 is
a “liability rule.”187 The court finds that a nuisance exists; the
plaintiff prevails on the defendant’s nuisance.188 Then the court
awards the plaintiff the damages that the judge or jury sets.189
Requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff damages allows the
defendant’s tortious activity to continue.190 The New York court’s
Boomer decision for permanent damages is a Rule 2 solution.191
Rule 3 is a “no-nuisance” rule.192 The court finds that a nuisance
does not exist.193 The losing plaintiff takes nothing.194 The court
allows the defendant’s activity to continue unscathed.195 Rule 4 is
a “plaintiff-pays” rule.196 The court finds that the defendant’s
nuisance exists.197 It enjoins the defendant’s activity only if,
however, the plaintiff pays the defendant, perhaps measured by
the defendant’s cost to comply.198
This Article turns to applying the Cathedral article’s
alternatives to Boomer and Atlantic Cement. It will delve into
normative matters of policy and principle, actual court decisions as
positive law, and vocabulary. It will qualify and criticize the
Cathedral article’s analysis because it circumscribes the injunction
remedy, leads to questionable results, and neither aids analysis
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1115–16.
See id. at 1116.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E. 2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 1970).
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1116.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1121.
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nor helps predict the results in many of the core situations it
purports to cover. This Article will conclude that scholars should
develop more precise vocabulary and better policy justifications
which will lead to sounder injunction decisions in actual pollution
disputes.
A. The Cathedral Article’s Rule 3
This Article takes Rule 3 out of order and discusses it first
before Rules 1 and 2 because it makes more remedies sense to
examine the threshold liability question, whether a defendant is
liable or not to a plaintiff under substantive law, before turning to
the subsequent question of the plaintiff’s remedy. Rule 3 does not
present the court with a choice of remedy.199 The court finds no
tort, no substantive liability.
It may be neither wise nor desirable for a court to restrict or
prohibit a landowner’s activity merely because it affects another
person.200 Adjoining landowners may adopt or may have adopted a
solution to maximize the value of both tracts. Perhaps the
plaintiff’s house was cheaper or more desirable in the first place
because of the defendant’s industrial site next door.
A court could compare or balance the plaintiff’s and the
defendant’s interests and find that, where the defendant’s activity
is useful to the community, no nuisance exists.201 The court will
consider several questions about land use, enterprise, and the
environment: What are the proper “costs” or “expenses” of a
defendant’s enterprise?202 If particulate pollution from the cement
plant is held to be a homeowner’s cost, will resources be allocated
efficiently? I think not. In addition to the health and
environmental hazards, if the price of cement excludes the
199. See id. at 1116.
200. See id. at 1118.
201. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 826, 827, 828 (AM. LAW INST.
1979); Laycock, supra note 61, at 16; DAN B. DOBBS & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, LAW
OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 5.7(2), at 533 (3d ed. 2018). But see
Jost v. Dairyland Power Coop., 172 N.W.2d 647, 652 (Wis. 1969) (“While there are
some jurisdictions that permit the balancing of the utility of the offending conduct
against the gravity of the injury inflicted, it is clear that the rule permitting such
balancing, is not approved in Wisconsin where the action is for damages.”).
202. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
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negative externality, it will be lower than it would be otherwise
which will lead to over-consumption of cement.203
“A nuisance may be merely the right thing in the wrong place,
like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.”204 Both whether a
nuisance exists and its remedy depend on the context and discrete
situation.205
We will return to pig pens below, but first, staying in a rural
landscape, here is the French court of appeals’ response to a
plaintiff’s complaint about a flock of chickens kept by another
resident of a rural village:
[T]he chicken is an ordinary and stupid animal, the truth of the
matter being that no one, not even a Chinese circus, has ever
been able to train it; living near a chicken implies a lot of
silence, some tender clucks and some cackles ranging from
happiness (laying of an egg) to serenity (tasting a worm) and
including panic (seeing a fox); this peaceful neighboring has
never disturbed no one but those who, for wholly different
reasons, hold a grudge against the owners of the gallinaceans;
this court shall not rule that the ship bothers the sailor, flour
disturbs the baker, the violin puts out the orchestra leader and
a chicken inconveniences an inhabitant of the hamlet of La
Rochette (402 souls) in the district of Puy-de-Dôme.206

The New York court may have retreated from Boomer in
Copart Industries v. Consolidated Edison,207 a similar dispute.
Copart prepared and stored new automobiles next to Consolidated
Edison’s (“Con Ed”) generating plant.208 Fly ash containing acid
203. See, e.g., DOBBS ET AL., supra note 95, § 404, at 648–49.
204. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
205. See id.
206. Russell L. Weaver, Guilhem Gil, Didier Poracchia & Francois Lichère,
The Law of Private Nuisance: French and American Perspectives, in REMEDIES
AND PROPERTY 9, 24 (Presses Universitaires d’Aix-Marseille, Russell Weaver &
Francois Lichère eds., 2013) (quoting Cour d’appel [CA] Riom, Sept. 7, 1995, JCP
G 1996, II, n° 22625, note Djigo A). The leading United States decision that
invading chickens are not a nuisance is the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in
Kimple v. Schaefer, 143 N.W. 505, 508 (Iowa 1913). The complicated and contested
subject of wandering animals is discussed in the Comments to the RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 21 cmt. a-i (AM.
LAW INST. 2010). Wild alligators are not a nuisance either. See Christmas v. Exxon
Mobile Corp., 138 So. 3d 123, 127–28 (Miss. 2014).
207. 362 N.E. 2d 968 (N.Y. 1977).
208. Id. at 969.
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allegedly from the plant marred the finishes on Copart’s new
cars.209 Copart went out of business.210 Copart sued Con Ed for
damages.211 The jury found for Con Ed.212 The court of appeals
affirmed.213 It approved jury instructions that required plaintiff
Copart to have shown that Con Ed had negligently or intentionally
harmed Copart.214
Another New York cement plant, this one a legal,
nonconforming use, was not, the court held, a nuisance because the
trial judge had found “the best and most modern
equipment . . . has eliminated most of the noise, dust and bright
lights . . . .”215 The dissent argued that the plant was a nuisance
that the court ought to remedy, as in Boomer, with permanent
damages.216
The Idaho court compared the economic utility of the
defendant’s industrial feedlot with 9,000 “odiferous” cattle and
found that it outweighed the plaintiff’s olfactory and other harm
from the defendant’s business.217 No nuisance, the court held, no
liability.218 “The State of Idaho is sparsely populated and its
economy depends largely upon the benefits of agriculture, lumber,
mining and industrial development.”219 The dissent quipped that
“[i]f humans are such a rare item in this state, maybe there is all
the more reason to protect them,” at least with damages.220
209. Id. at 970.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 973.
214. See id. (“Negligence and nuisance were explained to the jury at
considerable length and its attention was explicitly directed to the two categories
of nuisance, that based on negligence and that dependent upon intentional
conduct.”); see also Ross v. Lowitz, 120 A.3d 178, 194 (N.J. 2015) (citing the Second
Restatement of Torts for the position that nuisance-trespass must show either
fault, negligence, recklessness, intentional misconduct, or abnormally
dangerous-ultrahazardous activity). Professor Fraley maintains that the Second
Restatement of Torts’ addition of a negligence approach to nuisance was a
mistake. Fraley, supra note 98.
215. Benjamin v. Nelstad Materials, 625 N.Y.S.2d 281, 282 (1995).
216. See id. at 283 (Friedmann, J., dissenting).
217. Carpenter v. Double R Cattle Co., 701 P.2d 222, 224 (Idaho 1985).
218. See id. at 228.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 229 (Bistline, J., dissenting); see also Payne v. Skaar, 900 P.2d
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Perhaps the New York and Idaho courts above have rejected
the flexibility of adjusting damages and injunction remedies and
retreated to a rigid binary “nuisance”-“no nuisance” analysis. If so,
this approach may circumscribe courts’ use of nuisance and
injunctions as methods of environmental amelioration. This may
be an unsatisfactory way to respond to people affected by
pollution.221
The common law is flexible enough for a creative court to mold
substantive nuisance doctrine and remedies to meet changed
conditions. “Whatever the legitimacy of the oft-voiced fear of
judicial activism in other areas, in the environmental field a
complex of political, legal, and social factors makes judicial
sensitivity and creativity pivotally important to the way in which
all of us work, play, eat, sleep, and die.”222
B. The Cathedral Article’s Rules 1 and 2
Once the court has found that the defendant is liable under
the substantive law of nuisance or trespass, it turns to the
successful plaintiff’s remedy. This Article will next discuss the
court’s choice between granting the plaintiff an injunction, Rule 1,
and awarding damages, Rule 2.223
The Cathedral article defined the vocabulary in Rule 1 as the
“property rule,” and continued that “an entitlement is protected by
a property rule to the extent that someone who wishes to remove
the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him in a voluntary
transaction in which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon

1352, 1356, 1358–60 (Idaho 1995) (finding that a feedlot is a nuisance, that there
should not be damage or a shut-down injunction, but a conditions injunction
limiting the number of cattle and the type of feed and requiring manure removal).
221. See Comment, Internalizing Externalities: Nuisance Law and Economic
Efficiency, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 219, 230 (1978).
222. James L. Oakes, The Judicial Role in Environmental Law, 52 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 498, 499 (1977); see also John P. S. McLaren, The Common Law Nuisance
Actions and the Environmental Battle—Well-Tempered Swords or Broken Reeds?,
10 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 505, 506 (1972).
223. See Doug Rendleman, The Triumph of Equity Revisited: The Stages of
Equitable Discretion, 15 NEV. L J. 1397, 1429–31 (2015); DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra
note 201, at 533–37.
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by the seller.”224 Thus, a property entitlement is impeccable until
the owner parts with or sells the property voluntarily. The
property owner’s power to set the property’s value is exclusive.225
She can refuse any buyer’s offer.226 The property’s price is
completely within its owner’s control, whim, or discretion.227
Explaining Rule 2, the “liability rule,” the Cathedral article
continued that the court may decline to grant the successful
plaintiff an injunction that forbids the polluting tortfeasor from
continuing its nuisance.228 The owner may recover damages from
that defendant.229 If so, the owner must accept the court’s money
judgment for the property’s “value” as the court determines the
damages “objectively.”230
The Cathedral article’s “property rule”-“liability rule”
vocabulary and definitions have become part of the
economic-analysis vernacular. Scholars use them to describe the
nuisance or trespass court’s choice between an injunction and
damages. This Article returns below to the question of whether the
vocabulary and definitions describe the actual remedies
accurately.
C. Balancing the Hardships, Injunction Versus Damages
Since the Cathedral article’s first two solutions or rules
involve the court’s choice of remedies between granting the
plaintiff an injunction and awarding him damages, this Article will
treat them together along with the doctrine of balancing the
hardships, or a close synonym, a crucial mediating principle.231
Professor Laycock uses the phrase “undue hardship” to launch
essentially the same inquiry as balancing the hardships.232 As part
224. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1092.
225. See id.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. Id.
231. See DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 201, at 533; see also Laycock, supra
note 61, at 29–30.
232. Laycock, supra note 61, at 3.
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of its discrete decision whether to grant the successful nuisance or
trespass plaintiff an injunction, the court compares or balances the
plaintiff’s hardships without an injunction and the defendant’s
hardships from one.233 When the defendant’s comparative
hardship from an injunction is “undue,” the judge declines to grant
the plaintiff an injunction and defaults to awarding him damages
instead.234
Balancing may be disreputable. As Professor Farber observed,
“[t]he defendant in an injunction proceeding who asks the court to
balance the remedies in his favor is, in effect, asking the court to
approve of his decision not to comply with the duties that
law-abiding citizens comply with voluntarily. Thus, the court is
being asked to voice its approval of lawless conduct.”235
In 1948, Professor McClintock evaluated the court’s choice
between granting the successful plaintiff an injunction and
awarding him damages, and justified balancing the hardships:
[P]ractical experience has shown that in the administration of
specific relief there must be more discretion vested in the judge
than in the allowance of money damages for the injury suffered.
In the latter there can never be any greater injury inflicted on
defendant by allowing recovery than would be inflicted on
plaintiff by denying it. But it very often happens that the award
of specific relief would inflict a hardship on the defendant which
is out of all proportion to the injury its refusal would cause to
plaintiff. In these cases, by the great weight of authority, equity
still has discretion in adjusting the relief to be awarded to the
needs of the fact situation.236

This Article follows McClintock in accepting the necessity of
the balancing-the-hardships doctrine.237 It “balances” rather than
233. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)
(examining the four-factor test for granting a permanent injunction, which
includes balancing the hardships).
234. See id. (“A plaintiff must demonstrate . . . that remedies available at law,
such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for [his] injury. . . .”).
235. Daniel A. Farber, Equitable Discretion, Legal Duties, and Environmental
Injunctions, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 513, 535–36 (1984).
236. HENRY L. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY 51–52
(2d ed. 1948).
237. See Olivia L. Weeks, The Law Is What it Is, But Is it Equitable? The Law
of Encroachments Where the Innocent, Negligent, and Willful Are Treated the
Same, 39 CAMPBELL L. REV. 287, 342 (2017); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
TORTS §§ 936, 941 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
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“compares” the parties’ hardships primarily because balance is the
more common term. It balances the parties’ “hardships” instead of
their “equities” because “hardships” is more accurate and because
it eliminates a confusing definition and usage of “equity.”
At this point, it is propitious to confess an analytical and
vocabulary difficulty. The factors the court “balances” are not
commensurable. Balancing is a metaphor that means comparing
the parties’ benefits and detriments. The two sides of the “scale”
don’t contain identical, comparable, or even similar things.
Balancing, Justice Scalia wrote, “is more like judging whether a
particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.”238
Balancing the hardships, although not a complete analysis, focuses
the court’s judgment on the critical issues in the decision.
What would legal life be like without balancing the hardships?
An example comes from France.239 “Under trespass, even a minor
encroachment on the neighbor’s land justifies the cessation or
demolition of offending conduct as the Cour de cassation has noted
many times, including a case in which a wall overlapped by half a
centimeter upon the neighbor’s land.”240 Litigation without
balancing the hardships that leads to termination, destruction, or
removal would create harsh results for defendants who made
innocent and minor mistakes.241
A North Carolina court’s decision in Williams v. South &
South Rentals242 introduces another possibility. Defendant’s
“apartment building encroaches approximately one square foot on
plaintiff’s land.”243 Defendant’s encroachment was apparently
inadvertent.244 Plaintiff’s tract “has never been used for any
purpose, is oddly shaped, is located substantially in a creek bed, is
238. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
239. Weaver, Gil, Poracchia & Lichère, supra note 206, at 13.
240. Id. In two decisions in 2017 and 2018, the Cour de cassation, after
considering both the Civil Code and the European Convention on Human Rights,
reaffirmed its rigid no-encroachment position and destruction remedy. See
LAETITIA TRANCHANT, REMEDIES FORUM: CASES IN FRENCH LAW 1–3 (n.d.) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
241. See Kratze v. Indep. Order of Oddfellows, Garden City Lodge No. 11, 500
N.W.2d 115, 124 (Mich. 1993).
242. Williams v. S. & S. Rentals, Inc., 346 S.E.2d 665 (N.C. 1986).
243. Id. at 668.
244. Id. at 666.
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practically unusable and consists of one-fourth to one-third of an
acre.”245 Plaintiff offered to sell his tract to defendant for “a sum in
excess of $45,000.00.”246
After settlement negotiations failed, plaintiff sued defendant
for an injunction.247 The Tarheel State’s intermediate court of
appeals rejected the doctrine of balancing the hardships.248 It
concluded that:
[S]ince the encroachment and continuing trespass have been
established, and since defendant is not a quasi-public entity,
plaintiff is entitled as a matter of law to the relief prayed for,
namely removal of the encroachment. Accordingly, we remand
this case to the Superior Court for entry of a mandatory
injunction ordering defendant to remove that part of its
apartment building that sits upon plaintiff’s land as shown on
the plat contained in the record.249

If the court had balanced these parties’ hardships, this
defendant’s encroachment would probably have qualified for
permanent damages and, perhaps, an easement.250 Instead, after
the court of appeals’s decision, defendant purchased the disputed
portion from plaintiff for several thousand dollars.251 This observer
concludes that plaintiff may have employed a threat to make the
injunction effective to create an advantage in negotiating a
generous cash settlement.
Balancing the litigants’ hardships and retaining the
alternative of awarding the plaintiff damages are indispensable to
fair judicial decisions about whether to grant a trespass or
nuisance plaintiff an injunction. A judge administering the choice
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. See id. at 669.
249. Id.
250. See Capodilupo v. Vozzella, 704 N.E.2d 534, 537 (Mass. App. 1999);
Kratze v. Indep. Order of Oddfellows, Garden City Lodge No. 11, 500 N.W.2d 115
(Mich. 1993); Zerr v. Heceta Lodge No. 111, Indepen. Order of Odd Fellows, 523
P.2d 1018, 1024 (Or. 1974); Proctor v. Huntington, 238 P.3d 1117, 1123 (Wash.
2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1289 (mem.) (2011).
251. Olivia Leigh Weeks, Comment, Much Ado About Mighty Little—North
Carolina and the Application of the Relative Hardship Doctrine to Encroachments
of Permanent Structures on the Property of Another, 12 CAMPBELL L. REV. 71, 93
n.238 (1989); see also Weeks, supra note 237, at 344.
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between damages and an injunction needs to have the doctrine
available to prevent rigor and asperity for a defendant or a possible
unbalanced settlement.252
But a Boomer-Rule 2 permanent-damages solution should be
rare. Decisions awarding a successful plaintiff permanent
damages instead of an injunction are, Laycock wrote, sometimes
correct, sometimes based on special features, sometimes reveal a
preference for money based on superannuated notions of
irreparable injury, and sometimes quite muddled in their
analysis.253
Many
economic-analysis
scholars
support
the
permanent-damages remedy in Boomer. They argue that a court
should favor awarding a plaintiff damages instead of an injunction
when the defendant’s cost to comply merely exceeds the plaintiff’s
benefit; that is when the value or utility of the defendant’s
nuisance activity is larger than the harm it causes to the
plaintiff.254 The most extreme pro-damages, anti-injunction
scholar is Professor Lewin:
[E]fficiency concerns predominate in the selection of an
appropriate [nuisance] remedy, with a general presumption
against unconditional injunctive relief for prevailing plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs generally would be limited to recovering damages,
with injunctive relief being available only when the defendant’s
conduct was egregious or when it threatened the safety or
personal liberty of the plaintiff.255

252. See Laycock, supra note 61, at 24–26; Henry Smith, Exclusion and
Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 1042 (2004).
253. DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 160
(1991).
254. See Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Auctions: Property
Rules, Liability Rules, and Beyond, 106 YALE L.J. 703, 706–07 (1996); see also Ian
Ayres & Eric L. Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1032–33 (1995); Keith N. Hylton,
The Economic Theory of Nuisance Law and Implications for Environmental
Regulation, 58 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 673, 687 (2008); Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 713, 717–18 (1996); Mark A. Lemley, Contracting Around Liability Rules,
100 CAL. L. REV. 463, 463 (2012); see also Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest Jourden,
Remedies and the Psychology of Ownership, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1541, 1574–75
(1998).
255. Jeff L. Lewin, Compensated Injunctions and the Evolution of Nuisance
Law, 71 IOWA L. REV. 775, 802 (1986).
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The formulation of Rule 2, which compares values and utilities
to favor the defendant if its value is merely larger than the
plaintiff’s, puts too high of a burden on a plaintiff seeking an
injunction and favors damages over injunctions more than leading
scholars McClintock, Laycock, Smith, and Farber, as well as
United States common law.256
The judge in McClintock’s formulation quoted above should
grant the plaintiff an injunction unless “[the] hardship on the
defendant . . . is out of all proportion to the injury its refusal would
cause [the] plaintiff.”257
For Laycock, when the defendant’s cost to comply with an
injunction is “greatly disproportionate” to the plaintiff’s benefit
from it, the judge may decline to grant the plaintiff an injunction
and remit him to compensatory damages.258 If an injunction costs
the defendant quite a lot more than it benefits the plaintiff, then
the judge may balance the parties’ hardships and award the
plaintiff damages instead of an injunction.259 The judge, he wrote,
should grant a nuisance or trespass plaintiff an injunction “except
when cost is prohibitive” because an injunction will impose
“hardship [on defendant] greatly disproportionate to the benefits
it would confer on plaintiff,” that is when “fears of extortionate
holdouts become great enough to outweigh the value of enforcing
[plaintiff’s] property rights.”260
Professor Henry Smith has also challenged the
economic-analysis approach that favors awarding a nuisance
plaintiff damages.261 Smith maintains that judges should utilize an
injunction remedy more frequently than many of the

256. Infra notes 257–271 and accompanying text.
257. MCCLINTOCK, supra note 236, at 51–52.
258. Laycock, supra note 61, at 1.
259. Id.; see also Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of The Cathedral: The
Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2102 (1997) (arguing that an
injunction should be denied only if the balance of hardships “strongly” favors
defendant).
260. Laycock, supra note 61, at 23–24.
261. See Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1719, 1722 (2004); Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of
Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV. 965, 970 (2004); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property
as Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1781
(2007).
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economic-analysis scholars suggest.262 He encourages a judge to
grant a plaintiff an injunction, particularly when the defendant
has trespassed, but also for the defendant’s nuisance where the
defendant’s encroachment on the plaintiff’s property is less
palpable.263 Smith prefers an injunction to damages because of
information costs, a court’s measurement of a plaintiff’s damages
is expensive and imprecise.264
Farber wrote that the judge should enjoin an egregious
nuisance like the one in Boomer except “where the balance tilts
very strongly against the plaintiffs” and an injunction is
“infeasible . . . . [T]he plaintiff is always prima facie entitled to an
injunction, but in the case of highly disproportionate harm to the
defendant or the public, the injunction can be made defeasible or
conditional by a damage payment.”265
“Where,” the United States Supreme Court wrote, “substantial
redress can be afforded by the payment of money and issuance of
an injunction would subject the defendant to grossly
disproportionate hardship, equitable relief may be denied although
the nuisance is indisputable.”266
Later New York decisions bear out McClintock, Laycock,
Smith, Farber, and the Supreme Court. These decisions show that
the New York courts are reluctant to employ Boomer’s nuisance
262. See Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1719, 1740 (2004).
263. Id. at 1797.
264. Id. at 1773.
265. Daniel Farber, Reassessing Boomer: Justice, Efficiency, and Nuisance
Law, in PROPERTY LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN E.
CRIBBET 7, 17 (P. Hay & M. Hoeflich eds., 1988); see also Daniel Farber, The Story
of Boomer: Pollution and the Common Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW STORIES 7,
20, 22–23 (Richard Lazarus & Oliver Houck eds., 2005). In 1999, Farber’s
proposed approach to the court’s injunction-damages choices in a nuisance was to
favor a baseline of protection against such invasive activities. Rather
than leaving the remedy to the unrestrained balancing of the court, we
would begin with a presumption in favor of injunctive relief. In
[Boomer], the presumption might have been overcome by other
compelling social interests. Even if no injunction was appropriate, we
would argue for using a WTA [willingness to accept] rather than a WTP
[willingness to pay] measurement in order to uphold the [plaintiffs’]
baseline entitlement against [the defendant’s] outrageous nuisances.
DANIEL FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS
IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 113 n.36 (1999).
266. City of Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 338 (1933).
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remedy of no injunction but permanent damages and a servitude.
Instead the Empire State’s courts have given several reasons to
grant nuisance plaintiffs injunctions. An asphalt plant that was a
public nuisance was shuttered without comparing economic
consequences.267 Because another defendant’s racetrack was also a
public nuisance, Boomer-balancing was inapplicable.268 A third
court enjoined the nuisance because the defendant’s activity
violated a pollution permit.269 A New York court also enjoined
because less than a “vast” economic disparity existed between the
plaintiff and the defendant.270 A final court enjoined the
defendant’s activity because it also violated the zoning
ordinance.271
Other states’ courts’ Rule 2 decisions, which find a nuisance,
refuse an injunction and award damages, are not clear-cut.
Research is difficult. Courts, which often rely on decisions from
their jurisdiction, may not cite out-of-state decisions. Their
decisions raise numerous factors and points. The courts’
terminology varies. The courts’ discussions of injunctions are often
brief. I have tried to stay with similar nuisance decisions.
In Tamalunis v. City of Georgetown,272 the trial judge had
granted the plaintiff an injunction that protected him from the
city’s pipe that leaked human sewage.273 The Illinois Appellate
Court rejected plaintiff’s bad argument that defendant’s nuisance
triggers an injunction without comparative hardships.274 It held
that, for now, temporary damages would be adequate.275 The court
thought, however, that the sewage leak should stop, that the
defendant should repair or remove the pipe, and, in short, that the

267. See State v. Monoco Oil Co., 713 N.Y.S.2d 440, 446 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000).
268. See Hoover v. Durkee, 212 A.D.2d 839, 842 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
269. See Flacke v. Bio–Tech Mills, Inc., 463 N.Y.S.2d 899, 900 (N.Y. App. Div.
1983), appeal denied, 454 N.E.2d 1317 (1983).
270. See State v. Waterloo Stock Car Raceway, Inc., 409 N.Y.S.2d 40, 45 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1978).
271. See Little Joseph Realty, Inc. v. Town of Babylon, 363 N.E.2d 1163, 1168
(N.Y. 1977).
272. 542 N.E.2d 402 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
273. Id. at 408.
274. Id. at 413–14.
275. Id. at 414.
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nuisance should be abated.276 Thus plaintiff could sue again if and
when the offending sewage pipe leaked.277
In Weinhold v. Wolff,278 the Iowa court dealt with defendant’s
large-scale hog-feeding operation under the Hawkeye State’s
right-to-farm statute, a rural tort reform that attenuates a private
plaintiff’s nuisance litigation and remedies.279 Citing the
importance of pork to the state economy, the court said that
diminution in value plus special damages would be an adequate
remedy for the plaintiff and that closing the defendant’s feedlot
would be contrary to the right-to-farm statute.280 The court later
struck that statute down.281
In the Alabama court’s Baldwin v. McClendon,282 the court
cited the “comparative-injury” doctrine in refusing an injunction
that would “bring a severe blow” to defendants.283 The court’s
remedy was a conditional injunction that would shut defendant’s
hog feeding operation down if defendant didn’t pay plaintiff $3,000
permanent damages.284 Because the trial judge had visited
defendant’s operation, the Supreme Court emphasized his
equitable discretion.285
Feed-lot defenders have responded to critics’ turned-up noses
at farmers’ feedlots by invoking “the smell of money.” In short,
rural pigs are the social and economic equivalent of chickens in the
French village above.286 Since then, the dramatic trend to
industrial feedlots with thousands of animals has created a
difference in kind, not one of degree. In addition to polluting
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. 555 N.W. 2d 454 (Iowa 1996).
279. See id. at 458.
280. Id. at 462.
281. See Gacke v. Pork Xtra, 684 N.W. 2d 168, 185 (Iowa 2004); see also
Bormann v. Bd. of Supervisors, 584 N.W. 2d 309, 321 (Iowa 1998). For later
developments in Right-to-Farm legislation and litigation and analysis of North
Carolina’s statute, see also Cordon M. Smart, Comment, The “Right to Commit
Nuisance” in North Carolina: A Historical Analysis of the Right-to-Farm Act, 94
N.C. L. REV. 2097, 2100–03 (2016).
282. 288 So. 2d 761 (Ala. 1974).
283. Id. at 764.
284. Id. at 766.
285. See id. at 764.
286. Supra note 206 and accompanying text.
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streams and rivers, these titanic feedlots offend at least four of the
five senses and lower both property value and quality of life.287
Distance and the wind are the only antidotes to their odor. Their
public health effects include “antibiotic resistance and disease,
epidemic and pandemic influenza, and asthma and airway
obstruction.”288
Reading appellate reports sometimes leads me to turn up my
nose again, this time because of my idea that, in aid of defendants’
economic activity, some courts ignore the feedlot proprietors’
failures to provide sufficient buffer zones. If a court neither
shutters a defendant’s feedlot nor regulates its operation—that is
if it relegates its neighbor to damages—then the better measure of
damages is a buy-out or moving-expenses measure. Even in
Alabama in 1974, $3,000 in diminution damages seems stingy;
indeed, I think, woefully deficient. The Iowa court had added
special damages to permanent diminution damages; plaintiffs’
temporary damages were rent-based and included their
discomfort.289 The Iowa court’s less parsimonious diminution plus
special damages, might, if defendant forced the family to abandon
their home, let them build or buy a replacement.
Another feedlot under an Idaho right-to-farm statute led the
court to refuse a shut-down injunction but to approve a conditions
injunction that capped the number of animals and limited the type
of feed but didn’t award damages.290 A huge feeding operation in
Nebraska ended with the feedlot enjoined “from producing
offensive odors,” failing that of a shutdown order.291 A Rhode
Island municipality was given time to relocate its sewage pumping
station; the court coupled this future injunction with damages
until relocation.292 Under the doctrine of anticipatory nuisance, the
Alabama court affirmed a “don’t-build-it” injunction after the trial
287. See Smart, supra note 281, at 2107.
288. James Merchant & David Osterberg, Iowa View: DNR Scoring System
for Hog Farms Fails to Protect Our Health, DES MOINES REGISTER, Sept. 11, 2017,
at 9A.
289. See Weinhold v. Wolff, 555 N.W. 2d 454, 465–66 (Iowa 1996); see also
Oglethorpe Power Corp. v. Estate of Forrister, 774 S.E. 2d 755, 770 (Ga. Ct. App.
2015); Babb v. Lee Cty. Landfill SC, LLC, 747 S.E. 2d 468, 481 (S.C. 2013).
290. See Payne v. Skaar, 900 P.2d 1352, 1357 (Idaho 1995).
291. Goeke v. Nat’l Farms, 512 N.W. 2d 626, 629, 632 (Neb. 1994).
292. See Harris v. Town of Lincoln, 668 A.2d 321, 329 (R.I. 1995).

REHABILITATING THE NUISANCE INJUNCTION

1905

judge’s personal inspection.293 A student note writer in Iowa
recommended the anticipatory-nuisance doctrine because, if a
plaintiff sues before the defendant’s project begins, that deprives
the proprietor of its investments’ economic weight in the
balance.294
State appellate courts’ decisions granting the plaintiffs’
injunctions are, like the New York decisions, nuanced and
multi-factored. Many appear to be based on inadequate buffer
zones. In the long run, a court might be careful about extending
the buffer zone because “self pollution,” although harmful, isn’t a
tort.295
On the most general level, a court may decline to grant a
plaintiff an expensive and perhaps wasteful remedy. For courts,
the parties’ rights under the positive law determine the results
more than the economic-analysis view that the party whose use is
more valuable should prevail.296 The courts’ analysis is perforce
broader and considers more factors than economic utility. It
includes environmental values like health, protecting a species,
water, or air.297 The defendant’s state of mind affects a court’s
decision. Both courts and economists reprobate defendants’
take-now-pay-later tactics because of the destabilizing effect they
have on property rights.298
Establishing and maintaining an industrial nuisance is
intentional, but developing a business is not what we think of when
we think of an intentional tort. Although a court should refuse to
balance or compare to favor an intentional tortfeasor, future
defendants build cement plants, feedlots, and racetracks on
purpose.299
293. See Parker v. Ashford, 661 So. 2d 213, 215 (Ala. 1995).
294. See Ryan Teel, Note, Not in My Neighborhood: The Fight Against
Large-Scale Animal Feeding Operations in Rural Iowa, Preemptive Tactics, and
the Doctrine of Anticipatory Nuisance, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 497, 538–39 (2007).
295. See RICHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 277 (1995).
296. See Laycock, supra note 61, at 23.
297. See DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 201, at 536; Laycock, supra note 61, at
1, 24.
298. See DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 201, at 536.
299. Ordinarily a court will disqualify an intentional encroacher from
balancing the hardships. See Welton v. 40 E. Oak St. Bldg. Corp., 70 F.2d 377,
382–83 (7th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 590 (1934); Brown Derby Hollywood
Corp. v. Hatton, 395 P.2d 896, 899 (Cal. 1964); Missouri Power & Light Co. v.
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The courts’ analysis differs from classical economic analysis.
The courts’ vocabulary is imprecise and considers multiple factors.
Witness the differing vocabulary, Laycock’s “undue hardship”300
and my “balancing the hardships,”301 for similar comparisons.
Nor is it clear whether the impetus to balance the hardships
comes from the plaintiffs’ side as an element of their prima facie
case or if it is an affirmative defense for the defendant to interpose.
The Torts Restatement’s “factors” for granting a plaintiff an
injunction lump together the plaintiff’s case for an injunction and
the defendant’s affirmative defenses.302 In eBay v. MercExchange,
L.C.C., the Supreme Court stated a standard for a permanent
injunction that includes the plaintiff’s burden of proof to balance
the hardships in his favor.303 I have maintained elsewhere that
affirmative-defense status for balancing the hardships makes
more sense.304 Laycock says several times that what he names
undue hardship is a defense.305 However stated and located, we
agree that courts usually apply the doctrine “in plausible ways.”306
The Cathedral article, in what Laycock calls a “quite different
and rather stylized account of the law,”307 doesn’t mention
Barnett, 354 S.W.2d 873, 878 (Mo. 1962); Papanikolas Bros. Entrs. v. Sugarhouse
Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 535 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Utah 1975); see also DOBBS &
ROBERTS, supra note 201, at 534; Laycock, supra note 61, at n.8. An intentional
encroachment by a mistaken improver led to an injunction to remove regardless
of restitution and balancing the hardships. See Stuttgart Elec. Co. v. Riceland
Seed Co., 802 S.W.2d 484, 488–89 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991). But not always. Although
one defendant’s encroaching building extended over the plaintiff’s boundary line
eighty-eight inches and the trial judge had found that the defendant was either
willful or reckless, the court, after comparing benefits and hardships, refused to
grant the plaintiff a mandatory or removal injunction and remanded for
calculation of the plaintiff’s damages. See Morrison v. Jones, 430 S.W.2d 668, 675
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1968). Posner tells us why a court should treat an intentional
encroaching defendant differently. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW 70 (9th ed. 2014).
300. Supra note 232 and accompanying text.
301. Supra Part III.C and accompanying text.
302. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 941 (AM. LAW INST 1979).
303. See eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
304. RENDLEMAN, supra note 77, at 86 (arguing that the Court in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.C.C., would have “been better advised to classify [balancing the
hardships] as [an] affirmative defense[] with the burden on the defendant”).
305. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 61, at 1.
306. Id. at 19.
307. Id. at 20.
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balancing the hardships-undue hardship. Laycock maintains that
both the Boomer court and economic-analysis scholars
under-utilize the doctrine of undue hardship.308 The reason for
their omission is difficult to grasp. If a court balances the
hardships in the defendant’s favor, declines to enjoin, and awards
the plaintiff damages instead of an injunction, that court has, in
the Cathedral article’s vocabulary, converted the plaintiff’s
property-rule interest into his liability-rule interest. This advances
the Cathedral article’s and the Boomer court’s goal.
The modest suggestions above will clear the air in both the
literal and the metaphorical sense by encouraging more and more
detailed injunctions. An overemphasized law-and-economics
approach circumscribes common law evolution, for example, to
deal with climate change.309 If injunctions reduce particulate and
other pollution, our environment will improve and the rate of
climate change leading to global warming may be reduced.
D. The Cathedral Article’s Vocabulary of Property Rights and
Liability Rights
In addition to disfavoring the injunction remedy in ways that
undervalue plaintiffs with environmental interests, the Cathedral
article’s Rules 1 and 2 introduce confusing vocabulary deficiencies.
The Cathedral article called granting the plaintiff an injunction
Rule 1, a “property rule” and the second, Rule 2, awarding the
plaintiff damages, a “liability rule.”310 I disagree below with the
property rule–liability rule vocabulary of the first two parts of the
Cathedral article’s choices; that being the court’s choice between
an injunction and damages.
In the Cathedral article’s lexicon, the words “property” and
“liability” don’t have the usual torts, property, and remedies
meanings of property and liability. These usual meanings follow.

308. See id. at 19.
309. See Lynda L. Butler, The Resilience of Property, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 847, 876
(2013).
310. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1116.
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1. Property

A person’s property is her substantive interest.311 The owner
of the house and lot on Highland Road has a property interest in
her land. If a future defendant commits a repeated or continuing
trespass, the court will grant her an injunction that forbids the
defendant’s future trespasses.312 If a second defendant’s pickup
truck jumps the curb and destroys her gazebo, the court will award
her damages measured by diminution or cost-to-repair.313 If a third
defendant trespasses on plaintiff’s land repeatedly to fish in her
stream, the court will award her damages for her past harm plus
an injunction that forbids defendant’s future invasions.314
The usual meaning of the words property and liability
distinguishes the defendant’s substantive liability from the
plaintiff’s remedy, as between Rule 3 and Rules 1 and 2. The
landowner has a property interest in all three examples in the
paragraph above. Liability means that the defendant is
responsible for injuring the plaintiff’s substantive interest, which
the court will protect with a remedy, damages or an injunction
above.
The defendant is subject to liability for his tort in all three
examples. The court will find that the defendant is liable in tort for
each trespass on the plaintiff’s property before moving to her
remedy. But in the Cathedral article’s usage, the second
defendant’s tort transmogrified the plaintiff’s “property” interest
in preventing a future tort into a “liability” interest in recovering
damages. Calling the first example a property rule and the second
a liability rule changes the usual meaning of the words property
and liability.315

311. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY § 24.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
312. See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. 738, 799 (1824).
313. See, e.g., Vintage Rockland Realty Tr. v. Smiths Medical ASD, Inc., 287
F. Supp. 3d 126, 130 (D. Mass. 2018), appeal dismissed, No. 18-1159, 2018 WL
4042462 (1st Cir. Apr. 9, 2018).
314. See, e.g., Douglaston Manor, Inc. v. Bahrakis, 678 N.E. 2d 201, 202 (N.Y.
1997).
315. See Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1719, 1791 (2004).
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2. Liability
The Cathedral article names its second, or Rule 2, solution a
“liability rule.”316 The defendant’s trespass or nuisance activity
invades the plaintiff’s property interest, but the defendant pays
the plaintiff money damages set by the court.317 “Liability” used
this way is inaccurate Remedies terminology to analyze a
plaintiff’s remedies because the court always holds that the
defendant is liable to the plaintiff under substantive law before
turning to the plaintiff’s remedy.
After the court establishes that the defendant is liable to the
plaintiff, one remedy for the defendant’s nuisance or trespass is an
injunction, another is damages, a third is restitution.318 In addition
to being inaccurate, “property rule” and “liability rule” are
imprecise, too abstract, and too general. “Injunction remedy” and
“damages remedy” are more accurate and descriptive names than
“property rule” and “liability rule.”319 Because the analysis omits
restitution, an important money remedy that will be discussed
below, a more precise vocabulary would use “damages” in the
vernacular sense of all money remedies and break “damages” down
into “compensatory damages,” “punitive damages,” and
“restitution.”
“Property rule” and “liability rule” combine the court’s first
step, the defendant’s threshold substantive liability for its tort,
with the court’s second step, the remedy the court will employ on
behalf of the plaintiff. By calling the solutions “rules,” the
“property rule”–“liability rule” distinction assimilates the court’s
remedy or solution into substantive law rather than keeping it in
the separate realm of remedies. Again, professional understanding
would be better served with the more precise remedies terms
“injunction” and “damages.”
The Cathedral article’s reason to name the plaintiff’s
injunction remedy a “property” rule is that, after the judge grants
the plaintiff an injunction, the plaintiff can set the price that the
316. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1092.
317. See id. at 1105–06.
318. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 951 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
319. See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Three’s a Crowd: A Feminist Critique of
Calabresi and Melamed’s One View of the Cathedral, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 394, 469
(1999); Laycock, supra note 61, at 1.
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defendant must pay to continue its activity.320 The idea is that a
plaintiff’s injunction protects and values her property like, my
metaphor, an impenetrable stone wall that prevents any
encroachment without the owner’s consent. “When an injunction
issues,” the Harvard Law Review opined, “the possible severity of
the penalty for disobedience renders the defendant’s freedom of
choice virtually nonexistent.”321
The Cathedral article’s reason is based on the view that an
injunction is inviolable and self-enforcing.322 But this view is an
incorrect statement about an injunction as a remedy in actual
disputes.323 Many real-life defendants violate their real-life
plaintiffs’ real-life injunctions.324 A more accurate metaphor is that
an injunction resembles a stop sign with the defendant’s name on
it more than it resembles an immovable stone wall; “[A]n
injunction stops conduct only as well as a stop sign stops a car; the
defendant must apply the brakes and obey.”325 For an injunction to
work, the defendant must obey it.
If an errant motorist drives over the curb and wrecks an
owner’s gazebo, a court will find him liable under negligence law;
as a remedy, the court will tell him to pay the owner money
damages. If a trespass—or nuisance—injunction defendant
violates or “drives through” an injunction-sign and injures the
plaintiff or her property, the court will tell it to pay its victim
money for compensatory contempt.326
320. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, supra note 254, at 718.
321. Note, Developments in the Law–Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1005
(1965).
322. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of
Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
593, 593 (2008).
323. See id.
324. See RENDLEMAN, supra note 77, at 625–1104 (presenting Chapters 8
through 12; discussing contempt as an enforcement mechanism for a defendant’s
breach of an injunction, coercive contempt, compensatory contempt, and criminal
contempt).
325. RENDLEMAN, supra note 77, at 127. The original injunction metaphor was
Professor Charles Wright’s: “The injunction is not a set of handcuffs. In itself it
cannot prevent the defendant from doing the criminal act.” Charles Alan Wright,
The Law of Remedies as a Social Institution, 18 U. DET. L.J. 376, 391 n.65 (1955).
326. See Doug Rendleman, Compensatory Contempt: Plaintiff’s Remedy When
Defendant Violates an Injunction, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 971, 971 (1980); RENDLEMAN,
supra note 324, at 834–71.
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A court will measure the plaintiff’s compensatory-contempt
money recovery by the plaintiff’s loss from the defendant’s
violation of the injunction. Awarding the injunction plaintiff
post-violation compensatory contempt converts the plaintiff’s
injunction-right from being entitled to the defendant’s obedience
into a damages-right to recover money from the defendant.
Compensatory contempt reduces the plaintiff’s remedy from the
defendant’s conduct to the defendant’s cash.327 “The defendant’s
violation of [the] injunction convert[ed] the plaintiff from a person
with rights entitled to be enjoyed in fact to a person with a claim”
to recover money for compensatory contempt to redress his past
harm.328
If the Cathedral article’s “property rule” leads to an injunction
remedy and a “liability rule” leads to a money damages remedy, an
enjoined defendant can transmogrify the plaintiff’s right. “The
defendant can violate an injunction and convert the plaintiff’s
irreparable right into a cause of action for compensatory contempt,
money. By breach, the defendant has remitted the plaintiff to that
inadequate remedy, for it is now too late for [the] plaintiff to enjoy
the substantive right.”329
The judge has more contempt options than compensatory
contempt. An injunction defendant may also be charged with
coercive contempt or criminal contempt.330 The judge may also
impose coercive contempt, a staged fine or confinement, pending
the defendant’s future obedience; coercive contempt will structure
the defendant’s incentive to comply in the future.331 Criminal
contempt punishment is the third option.332 But for many
violations, the plaintiff’s remedy will be compensatory contempt.333
If experience from structural injunctions against government
defendants carries over to environmental injunctions, unless there
are several iterations of disobedience, coercive contempt and
327. See Doug Rendleman, Compensatory Contempt: Plaintiff’s Remedy When
Defendant Violates an Injunction, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 971, 974 (1980).
328. RENDLEMAN, supra note 77, at 193.
329. Id. at 128.
330. See Rendleman, supra note 327, at 971.
331. See id. at 974.
332. See id. at 971.
333. See id.
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criminal contempt are unlikely to be severe in complex litigation
with an established business defendant.334
Professor John Golden also refutes the Cathedral article’s
vocabulary that property rule and liability rule are hermetic closed
categories.335 Golden’s analysis is similar to mine, although his
metaphor differs. Because a defendant’s violation converts an
injunction into money, an injunction, he has written, isn’t an “off
switch.”336 He criticizes other observers’ dichotomy between
damages and injunction as “misleading.”337 Because there is no
criminal contempt to speak of for defendants’ violations of patent
injunctions, realistically an injunction threatens compensatory
contempt for violation.338 This, Golden maintains, is insufficient
deterrence.339 Back to metaphors, since an injunction is not an “off
switch,” (in my metaphor a stone wall), “an injunction operates
essentially as a mere gateway to compensatory contempt’s
higher-than-normal
monetary
sanctions
delivered
with
higher-than-normal speed.”340
Scholars who understand its vocabulary but recognize its
analytical shortcomings have cracked the Cathedral walls.341 In
334. See Doug Rendleman, Prospective Remedies in Constitutional
Adjudication, 78 W.VA. L. REV. 155, 169 (1976) (“A single generalization
emerges: courts hesitate to use contempt against government officials.”).
335. See, e.g., John M. Golden, Injunctions as More (or Less) than “Off
Switches”: Patent-Infringement Injunctions’ Scope, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1402
(2012).
336. Id. at 1401.
337. Id.
338. See id. at 1410–13 n.43, 60.
339. See id. at 1413 n.62.
340. Id. at 1471.
341. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 76, at 971 (discussing Cathedral’s
“flawed conception”); Epstein, supra note 259, at 2091 (discussing the flaws in
Calabresi and Melamed’s argument regarding property rules and liability rules);
Golden, supra note 335, at 1401 (acknowledging the varying functions of
injunctions outside of the strict Calabresi and Melamed interpretation); Laycock,
supra note 61, at 1 (noting that Calabresi and Melamed fail to take into account
“the in-between cases of punitive damages, disgorgement of profits, and other
monetary remedies that are more than compensatory”); Daphna
Lewinsohn-Zamir, The Choice Between Property Rules and Liability Rules
Revisited: Critical Observations From Behavioral Studies, 80 TEX. L. REV. 219,
220 (2001) (“Recently, however, [Melamed and Calabresi’s] conventional wisdom
has been questioned.”); Smith, supra note 79, at 1007–11, 1019–21 (explaining
that the premise Calabresi and Melamed rely on in the Cathedral article is
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his piece about the gulf between remedies and law and economics
in the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Professor Sam Bray
maintained that scholars of remedies generally ignored the
“featherweight” Cathedral article which has had “little influence”
in remedies.342 Remedies scholars’ perspectives and goals differ
from law-and-economics scholars’: remedies scholars emphasize
plaintiffs’ compensation, economics scholars favor reducing costs
and deterrence of future defendants’ breaches.343
The Cathedral article, Bray showed, got the injunction
backwards. The injunction, contrary to the Cathedral article, is not
exclusive, not automatic, and not tied tightly to the plaintiff’s
substantive entitlement. The judge has more discretion to choose
and shape an injunction. A judge will favor an injunction when
market valuation is difficult, not when it is easy. An injunction
requires more, not less, judicial involvement. An injunction is not
difficult to dissolve or amend.344
So far, this Article has parted with the Cathedral article on
several grounds. It leads the court to under-value an injunction.
The Cathedral article downgrades protecting the public health and
the environment, which are better protected by ordering the
harmful activity modified or stopped instead of awarding money
damages. Its analysis is out of order, placing the plaintiff’s remedy
ahead of the defendant’s liability. It leads to analysis that favors
damages over an injunction in many lawsuits where an injunction
would be a superior remedy. Its vocabulary is abstract and
confusing. It oversimplifies and doesn’t understand the injunction
as a remedy administered by courts.
One point a skeptic might make is that the foregoing critique
is irrelevant and beside the point because the law-and-economics
property-right, liability-right vocabulary exists only where
professors talk exclusively to other professors and to law students;
but it hasn’t found its way into lawyers’ and courts’ traditional
“questionable at best”).
342. Bray, supra note 49, at 73. Professor Bray’s footnote 14 identifies the
author’s work as an exception to the paucity of law-and-economics in the field of
remedies. See Bray, supra note 49, at 73 n.14 (stating that although the Cathedral
article is largely ignored, “[t]here are exceptions, such as the critiques offered by
Laycock and Rendleman . . . as well as E Sherwin”).
343. See generally Bray, supra note 49.
344. See id. at 80.
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doctrinal vernacular where actual decisions occur.345 The response
is that professors use property-right, liability-right vocabulary to
express a narrow and parsimonious view of the injunction, the
most effective remedy. Graduates may leave the vocabulary at the
law school but take the circumscribed injunction into practice. Law
reform may start in law school classrooms and faculty lounges.
E. Post-Injunction Negotiation and Hold Outs
Many economic-analysis writers who argue in favor of
awarding a nuisance plaintiff damages emphasize transaction
costs.346 The first risk is that the plaintiff will actually enforce the
injunction. The Cour de cassation’s rigid destruction remedy for a
defendant’s encroachment illustrates this potential risk.347 In an
industrial nuisance, the risk is that the defendant’s operation will
be shut down.
The second risk is that the parties’ post-injunction negotiation
will lead to an unbalanced settlement like the one above in
Williams v. South & South.348 This Article speculated that those
parties’ post-injunction negotiation may have ended with a large
cash settlement.349
The Boomer court’s majority opinion feared that plaintiff and
defendant might negotiate leading the defendant polluter to
override the injunction by purchasing the right to continue: “The
parties could settle this private litigation at any time if defendant
paid enough money and the imminent threat of closing the plant
would build up the pressure on defendant.”350
The Coase theorem supports parties’ post-injunction
negotiation; it maintains that, without transaction costs, people
will exchange and trade and that resources will end up owned by
345. See, e.g., supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.
346. See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1094.
347. Supra notes 239–240 and accompanying text.
348. 346 S.E.2d 665 (1986).
349. See supra notes 242–251 and accompanying text.
350. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., Inc., 257 N.E. 2d 870, 873 (N.Y. 1970);
see also DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 223, at 541–43. A potential unbalanced
settlement is the principal reason Laycock gives to agree with the damages
remedy in Boomer. See Laycock, supra note 61, at 21–22.
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the person who values them the most.351 The parties’ negotiations
after an injunction are a foundation of many economists’ analysis
of nuisance remedies. If the court grants a successful plaintiff an
injunction that benefits him less than it will cost the losing
defendant to comply, the defendant will, they predict, negotiate
with the plaintiff to settle the injunction.352
The rational-choice idea that people uniformly make decisions
to maximize their economic self-interest convinces many
economic-analysis scholars that the Boomer plaintiffs were likely
to relinquish their rights under an injunction for more than their
loss but less than Atlantic Cement’s $45,000,000 investment. The
plaintiffs would employ a shut-down injunction as a bargaining
threat to leverage an “excessive,” money settlement; some
observers even borrow the criminal law’s adjective to say an
“extortionate” settlement.353
If, as they assume, the property owner’s interest is really
money, then, the scholars maintain, the court ought to limit him
to recovering damages set in court by a judge or jury instead of
allowing him to use the injunction as leverage to extract a
“windfall” settlement from the cement company.354
The economic-analysis scenario becomes even more grim in its
third act. Each of several nuisance-tort victims has an incentive
not to settle until after the others have, then to become a “holdout”
and raise the defendant’s price even more. A victim’s delay in
coming to terms with the defendant will facilitate his ability to
become, in effect, a nuisance troll and to exact an even larger toll
from the defendant. In many conflicting use situations, where a
defendant does a little harm to each of a lot of people, it will be
difficult and expensive for the court to locate all affected people
and to calculate and distribute their damages.

351. See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 16 (1960).
352. See Ayres & Balkin, supra note 254, at 706–07; Ayres & Talley, supra
note 254, at 1032–33; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 254, at 717–18; James E.
Krier & Stewart J. Schwab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in
Another Light, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 440, 479 (1995) (“[A]ntagonists can often
negotiate to efficient outcomes.”); Lemley, supra note 254, at 473; Rachlinski &
Jourden, supra note 254, at 1574–75.
353. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 941, cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
354. See supra note 352 and accompanying text.
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Some economic-analysis commentators employ a variation
that favors the nuisance plaintiff’s right to use and enjoy his
property a little more. They favor granting the plaintiff an
injunction but only where the defendant’s negotiations with a few
plaintiffs are feasible because of low transaction costs.
In conflicting-use situations in which transaction costs are low,
[because of only one or few plaintiffs] . . . injunctive relief
should normally be allowed as a matter of course . . . But when
transaction costs are high, [because of the plethora of
plaintiffs] . . . the allocation of resources to their most valuable
uses is facilitated by denying an injunction and instead
remitting the plaintiff to damages equal to the cost to him of the
violation of his rights, thus enabling the violation to continue if
it is worth more to the violator than it costs to the victim.355

A bilateral monopoly of two persons with no other market
alternatives combined with a large disparity in values or benefits
may lead negotiations to break down if each person claims a large
share of the difference. Economists also consider this breakdown
to be a transaction cost.356
How valid is the extensive literature that emphasizes
court-set damages, a “liability” rule, over an injunction, a
“property” rule? How persuasive is the argument that
subordinates an injunction to damages because of the fear that
injunction plaintiffs will coerce an unbalanced settlement?
Other scholars register doubts about the Boomer court’s
money-damages remedy and the economic-analysis arguments
that support it. What behavioral economists have named the
“endowment effect” teaches us that its owner values property

355. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.9, at 70 (9th ed.
2014); see also id. § 4.12, at 140–44; A. Mitchell Polinsky, Resolving Nuisance
Disputes: The Simple Economics of Injunctive and Damage Remedies, 32 STAN. L.
REV. 1075, 1076 n.7 (1980) (citing Posner’s discussion of transaction costs as they
relate to injunctive relief); THOMAS SCHELLING, STRATEGIES OF COMMITMENT AND
OTHER ESSAYS 195 (2006)
It will be the rare environmental externality that permits us, at no
exorbitant expense, to identify all the victims and assess damages
individually. We probably have a crude aggregate estimate of damage,
and at the level of an individual victim there may be no reliable way of
determining how much of any apparent costs is actually due to the
regulated emissions.
356. See, e.g., Ayres & Talley, supra note 254, at 1037.
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higher than the market does.357 A court that refuses to grant a
plaintiff an injunction to exclude a trespasser or to stop a polluter
is ignoring this subjective aspect of the landowner-plaintiff’s
interest.358 A judge, Professor Henry Smith wrote, enjoins a
defendant not to engage in cost-benefit analysis, but to vindicate
the landowner’s previously existing right to use and exclude.359 The
economic-analysis scholars and the Boomer court’s fear that a
homeowner may use an injunction to extract an excessive
settlement downgrades or ignores that subjective aspect.
Awarding a nuisance or trespass plaintiff damages instead of
an injunction may undermine the traditional legal principles that
an owner’s real property is unique and that money damages are an
inadequate remedy to protect that property.360 Robust property
rights require effective remedies. “From at least the early 19th
century,” Chief Justice Roberts wrote, concurring in eBay v.
MercExchange, L.L.C.,361
courts have granted injunctive relief upon a finding of
infringement in the vast majority of patent cases. This ‘long
tradition of equity practice’ is not surprising, given the difficulty
of protecting a right to exclude through monetary remedies that
allow an infringer to use an invention against the patentee’s
wishes . . . .362

A money award communicates to an owner that his “unique”
interest, protected by a right to exclude, is merely economic,
readily converted to currency. As the dissenting opinion charges,
the court in Boomer, in effect, allowed the cement company to
continue its tort and to buy a license to pollute.363 It also, in effect,

357. See Rachlinski & Jourden, supra note 254, at 1544; Jennifer Arlen,
Comment, The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51 VAND. L. REV.
1765, 1771 (1998).
358. Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Public Nuisance Law and the New
Enforcement Actions, 18 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 43, 65 (2010).
359. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance,
90 VA. L. REV. 965, 1023 (2004).
360. Laycock, supra note 61, at 22.
361. 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
362. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Roberts,
C.J., concurring).
363. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 876 (N.Y. 1970)
(Jasen, J., dissenting).
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granted eminent domain power to a private interest.364 The court’s
majority favored the defendant’s commercial development even
when that development exacted a toll on residents and property
owners.365
Yes, but what about the plaintiff who uses an injunction to
leverage an excessive settlement?
To begin with, a plaintiff may not have an opportunity to
negotiate a settlement because the defendant will appeal rather
than negotiate.366
Also, a generous settlement may not be that undesirable. If
the judge grants a successful landowner plaintiff an injunction,
that injunction implements the endowment effect and allows the
plaintiff to negotiate with the defendant from a position of strength
that recognizes the endowment effect and the unique quality of the
plaintiff’s property interests.367 If a judge cannot consider the full
subjective value of a landowner’s sentiment, attachment,
discomfort, and annoyance in setting damages, then granting the
owner an injunction will be a better way to assure the plaintiff’s
full compensation.368
Will, however, a landowner-plaintiff employ an injunction to
punish the defendant or to achieve over-compensation? There is
another way to frame this issue: is the risk of a plaintiff either
closing a defendant’s valuable enterprise or leveraging an
excessive money settlement a sufficient reason to deny the plaintiff
an injunction which risks judicial under-compensation? Laycock
favors awarding the plaintiff damages “when the transaction costs
of such renegotiation would be high.”369

364. See id. The Torts Restatement disagrees. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 941, cmt. d (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
365. See Boomer, 257 N.E. 2d at 876 (Jasen, J., dissenting) (“It is the same as
saying to the cement company, you may continue to do harm to your neighbors so
long as you pay a fee for it.”).
366. See Lemley, supra note 254, at 475.
367. See supra note 357.
368. See Richard A. Epstein, Too Pragmatic by Half, 109 YALE L.J. 1639, 1648
(2000) (reviewing DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO–PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD (1999)); Richard A. Epstein,
A Clear View of The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106 YALE L.J.
2091, 2012 (1997).
369. Laycock, supra note 61, at 21.
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Taking a different and perhaps more salutary approach, Mr.
Barton Thompson, as he was in 1975, maintained in his Stanford
Law Review Note that, instead of assuming an excessive coerced
settlement, the judge could prevent plaintiffs’ over-compensation
by supervising negotiations and approving settlements.370
Moreover, he maintained that courts should expand equitable
estoppel and laches to bar a plaintiff who either led defendant on
or who waited too long to sue.371
Justice Charles Fried, as he was then, wrote an opinion in
Goulding v. Cook372 for the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
(SJC) that, with context, provides a helpful way to examine the
litigants’ post-injunction negotiation and other remedies issues.
To resolve a dispute with the Cooks about a 3,000 square-foot
triangle of land in a residential neighborhood where the Cooks
were preparing to sink a septic tank, the Gouldings sought a
declaration of ownership and an anti-trespass injunction.373 After
the trial judge denied the plaintiff Gouldings’ motion for a
preliminary injunction, the defendant Cooks buried their septic
tank under the disputed triangle.374
At the later plenary hearing, however, the trial judge held that
the Gouldings owned the land.375 But, apparently acceding to the
Cooks’ fait accompli, the “improvement,” the lower courts granted
the Cooks an easement for their tank, its price to be set by the
parties’ negotiation, failing their agreement, apparently, by the
judge.376

370. See Thompson, supra note 79, at 1582. Mr. Thompson is now the Robert
E. Paradise Professor of Natural Resources Law. “Buzz” Thompson is still at
Stanford.
Barton
H.
“Buzz”
Thompson,
Jr.,
STAN.
L.
SCH.,
https://law.stanford.edu/directory/barton-thompson/ (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
371. See Thompson, supra note 79, at 1582 n.69; see also Henry L. McClintock,
Discretion to Deny Injunction against Trespass and Nuisance, 12 MINN. L. REV.
565, 569 (1928) (“[T]he remedy to which plaintiff would otherwise be entitled may
be denied where he has delayed seeking it for a period which, under all the
circumstances, amounts to laches.”).
372. 661 N.E. 2d 1322 (Mass. 1996).
373. Id. at 1323.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id.
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The SJC reversed.377 Justice Fried’s opinion begrudgingly
recognized balancing the hardships, but rejected its application.
The Cooks must remove the septic tank and pay the Gouldings
damages.378 “[T]he concept of private property represents a moral
and political commitment that a pervasive disposition to balance
away would utterly destroy.”379 Rejecting the Cooks’ invitation to
balance the hardships, the court refused to “obliterate [property
rights] in favor of a general power of equitable adjustment and
enforced good neighborliness.”380
The SJC refuted the lower courts’ reasoning about the Cooks’
“good faith,” the Gouldings’ lack of harm, and the trial judge’s
equitable discretion.381 The Cooks undertook the excavation
project aware that the Gouldings’ lawsuit was still pending.382 An
underground septic tank isn’t always invisible and harmless. And
the trial judge lacked equitable discretion to act on an error of
law.383
Justice Fried was aware that the parties’ negotiation had
preceded the lawsuit.384 The lower courts had balanced the
hardships in the Cooks’ favor. But, although they declined to order
the Cooks’ septic tank on the Gouldings’ property exhumed, the
lower courts had recognized the Gouldings’ property interest in the
triangle by requiring the Cooks to pay for the septic-tank easement
through what appeared to be supervised negotiation. The
Gouldings could not, under their view, exploit a mandatory
injunction to negotiate an unbalanced settlement.385
The SJC’s mandatory order based on the Gouldings’ property
right left them in a powerful monopoly position to vindicate or to
be “compensated” for their property interest.

377. Id. at 1325.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 1324.
380. Id. at 1325; see also Brandao v. DoCanto, 951 N.E.2d 979, 987 (Mass.
App. 2011) (citing Goulding v. Cook in granting an encroachment-removal
injunction).
381. Goulding v. Cook, 661 N.E.2d 1322, 1325 (Mass. 1996).
382. Id.
383. See id.
384. Id. at 1323.
385. See id. at 1325.
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The order created three apparent risks. First, that the
litigants’ mutual antipathy would prevent a value-maximizing
solution. Second, that the Gouldings would exploit their monopoly
to extract an excessive and over-compensatory settlement. Third,
that the Gouldings would exploit their mandatory injunction to
deprive the Cooks of a workable sewage system and indeed of the
ability to utilize their property as a residence. What unfolded?
A phone conversation with the Gouldings’ lawyer, Mr. John
Wyman, answered some of my questions.386 In June of 2012, the
Gouldings still lived next-door to the Cooks. The Gouldings and the
Cooks were, however, “unfriendly.”387 What about the Cooks’ septic
tank under the Gouldings’ land? Neither a buyout nor exhumation
had occurred.388 When the SJC decided for the Gouldings in 1996,
a sewer line was expected in their costal town. The Cooks planned
to hook up and abandon the septic tank. The Gouldings, it turned
out, rested on their victory in principle; they didn’t take advantage
of their injunction to force the issue. The sewer-line was slow, more
than a decade, in coming. The Cooks’ septic tank was in use in the
Gouldings’ land until “recently” when the sewer line finally came
to the vicinity.389 Property-lawyer John Wyman’s general
observation that neighbor versus neighbor litigation leads to
“awful acrimony” and “no compromise”390 bears out Professor
Farnsworth’s points below about nuisance litigants.
The rational-choice theory that supports the likelihood of
parties’ post-injunction negotiation and settlement founders in the
face of many actual nuisance litigants’ behavior observed in two
scholars’ studies. Professor, as he was then, now Dean, Ward
Farnsworth located twenty appealed nuisance lawsuits and asked
the lawyers whether the parties had negotiated a settlement after
an appellate decision.391 None had.392 The litigants, Farnsworth
386. Telephone Interview with John Wyman, Attorney for Plaintiffs, in
Goulding v. Cook, 661 N.E.2d 1322 (Mass. 1996) (June 2012) (notes on file with
author).
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain After
Judgment? A Glimpse Inside the Cathedral, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 373 (1999).
392. Id.
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learned, just didn’t bargain.393 Because the parties’ mutual enmity
grew and hardened during protracted litigation, Farnsworth
concluded that the opponents simply did not negotiate after their
respective courts decided.394 For an actual human being litigant,
the acrimony of a protracted dispute militates against any
discussion, amicable or otherwise, afterwards.395 Coase’s
bargaining never occurred. Professor Thaler took Farnsworth’s
study to its logical conclusion: that it refutes the Coase theorem.396
Professor Maurice Van Hecke had earlier examined actual
litigation to learn whether mandatory injunctions against
defendants’ encroachments on plaintiffs’ property were effective
and whether the injunctions had led to “extortionate”
settlements.397 His conclusions were similar to Farnsworth’s later
study of the parties’ post-injunction negotiation after nuisance
injunctions. Van Hecke contacted forty-four lawyers in
twenty-nine lawsuits and received replies from thirty-one lawyers
concerning twenty-five injunctions.398 He concluded that
seventy-five percent of the injunctions were effective and that little
evidence existed that the injunctions had been used to coerce
settlements.399 Attorneys who participated in “extortionate”
settlements might not, however, have responded to the professor’s
survey.
In an email to the author, Professor John Golden suggested a
“likely” argument: the judge should not grant an injunction “when
the likelihood of later negotiation is very small (i.e., when
transaction costs can be understood to be very large—perhaps in
these cases because the relevant parties simply cannot bear to deal

393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 384 (“Frequently the parties were not on speaking terms by the
time the case was over (sometimes much earlier).”); see also RICHARD THALER,
MISBEHAVING: THE MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 268 (2015); Lemley, supra
note 254, at 475; Daniel A. Farber, The Story of Boomer: Pollution and the
Common Law, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 113, 141 (2005) (“In reality these negotiations
may be impossible [because] . . . the parties are too angry to negotiate at all . . . .”).
396. THALER, supra note 395, at 268.
397. See Maurice T. Van Hecke, Injunctions to Remove or Remodel Structures
Erected in Violation of Building Restrictions, 32 TEX. L. REV. 521, 521 (1954).
398. Id. at 535.
399. Id. at 535, 538.

REHABILITATING THE NUISANCE INJUNCTION

1923

with one another)?”400 Courts exist to resolve bitter disputes that
the parties cannot. In a civilized society, the court cannot let the
lawbreaker’s enmity and obduracy, even mutual enmity, hold the
plaintiff’s rights prisoner.
Laycock commented that “small-scale studies cast doubt on
[the] assumption [of the parties’ post-injunction negotiation].”401 I
invite empirical study, though designing an experiment to study
prolonged and bitter interpersonal conflict in the real or
experimental world will be, to say the least, difficult. One
approach, game theory, is based on rational adversaries, which
many disputants are not.402
The economic-analysis picture of nuisance builds on the
parties’ post-injunction negotiation that may not happen in real
life. In other words, it is based on an over-simplified theory-based
view of human nature that exaggerates litigants’ “rational”
economic behavior and decision-making based on economic
motives of self-interest and de-emphasizes real litigants’ emotional
and cultural responses to actual conflict.403
Humans are quirky and unpredictable critters often blown off
a rational course by emotional whims and crosscurrents. A court
deciding whether to grant a nuisance or trespass plaintiff an
injunction or to award damages should de-emphasize, sometimes
ignore, the scholars’ rational-choice theory that the parties’
self-interest will lead them to post-injunction negotiation. There
should be no presumption, no blanket rule, about negotiation.
Many “more mundane” nuisance lawsuits like neighborhood
conflicts “display claims in which feelings and a sense of right and
wrong predominate over economic concerns . . . . The time has not
yet arrived when the idiosyncratic, emotional side of the law can
be ignored . . . .”404 The judge should decide whether to predict
negotiation anew in the factual context of each discrete dispute.

400. E-mail from John M. Golden, Loomer Family Professor in Law,
University of Texas School of Law, to Doug Rendleman, Robert E. R. Huntley
Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law (Apr. 12, 2013
2:58 PM) (on file with author).
401. Laycock, supra note 61, at 32.
402. See RENDLEMAN, supra note 77, at 770–71.
403. See Lewinsohn-Zamir, supra note 341, at 228–29.
404. DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 231, at 543–44.
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Post-injunction negotiation between opponents in commercial
litigation, patent disputes for example, seems more likely.
Although some patent litigation is between “strangers,” most
serious patent disputes start with negotiation for a license and, if
parley founders, proceed to a cease-and-desist or demand letter
before suit is filed.405 Since the parties are usually business entities
that have been negotiating all along, no-one should be too
surprised to learn that negotiation continues after preliminary
injunctions, permanent injunctions, and while an appeal is
pending or after it is decided. In eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.C.,406
the parties’ negotiation continued after the trial judge, on remand
from the Supreme Court, denied eBay’s motion for an injunction.407
The parties settled this bitter and protracted lawsuit.408
F. Rule 4: Winner Pays
We have examined three of the Cathedral article’s solutions:
Rule 3 no-liability, holding for the defendant; Rule 1 granting the
plaintiff an injunction; and Rule 2 awarding the plaintiff damages.
The Cathedral article’s fourth solution is Rule 4, a hybrid remedy:
the court grants the plaintiff an injunction, but it orders the
“winning” plaintiff to pay the defendant, hence a “compensated
injunction.”409
In the universal example of Rule 4, the Arizona Supreme
Court employed a compensated injunction in Spur Industries, Inc.
v. Del E. Webb Development Co.410 Del Webb developed and built
405. See Golden, supra note 335, at 1448 (“[T]he over-whelming majority of
patent-infringement disputes settle before an injunction issues . . . .”).
406. 500 F. Supp. 2d 556 (E.D. Va. 2007).
407. Id. 559.
408. RENDLEMAN, supra note 77, at 87. Party acrimony affects post-judgment
bargaining concerns. Consider different hostile parties: a Jewish ex-husband who
refuses permission to remarry, a “get,” and his ex-wife who, seeking her ex’s get,
obtains a money judgment for the tort or breach of contract of get-refusal.
Reversing the parties in post-nuisance-injunction bargaining, the ex-wife who
exchanges her money judgment for his get is freed to remarry. Benjamin Shmueli,
Post-Judgment Bargaining with a Conversation with the Honorable Professor
Guido Calabresi, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1181, 1183 (2015).
409. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1116–23; see also DOBBS &
ROBERTS, supra note 231, at 538.
410. Spur Indus. Inc v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 708 (Ariz. 1972).
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Sun City, which catered to retired people in what was then a
sparsely populated area near defendant’s cattle feedlot.411 The
developer expanded its residential development toward
defendant’s feedlot.412 Litigation followed in the advance’s wake.413
Although the retired homeowners had “moved to the
nuisance,” because of flies, insects, or disease, the feedlot was a
nuisance.414 The homeowners were, the court held, entitled to an
injunction.415 However, the homeowners’ position tempered the
remedy.416 The court required the developer, who was more at fault
than the homeowners, to pay defendant’s expenses of shutting
down its feedlot and moving it.417 Although the court held that
defendant’s feedlot was an enjoinable nuisance, it used defendant’s
“coming-to-the-nuisance” defense at the remedy stage to require
the developer-plaintiff to pay the cost of moving defendant’s feedlot
away from residential areas.418
Law school casebooks often include Spur after Boomer as a
principal nuisance case.419 However, not even in a classroom
hypothetical could we expect the homeowners in Boomer to be able
to pay to move Atlantic Cement’s plant.420 Del Webb, the developer,
was the source of the funds, not the homeowners; given time for a
411. Id. at 704.
412. Id. at 705.
413. Id.
414. Id. at 706.
415. Id.
416. See id. at 707.
417. See id. at 708.
418. See id.
419. See, e.g., JOHN E. CRIBBET, ROGER W. FINDLEY, ERNEST E. SMITH & JOHN
S. DZIENKOWSKI, PROPERTY: CASES AND MATERIALS 679–91 (9th ed. 2008)
(presenting Spur after Boomer); DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 76, at 749–58
(including Spur immediately after Boomer); CANDACE S. KOVACIC-FLEISCHER,
JEAN C. LOVE & GRANT S. NELSON, EQUITABLE REMEDIES, RESTITUTION AND
DAMAGES: CASES AND MATERIALS 804–23 (8th ed. 2011) (presenting Spur after
Boomer); THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 965–80 (3d ed. 2017) (presenting Spur after Boomer); VICTOR E.
SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & DAVID F. PARTLETT, PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S
TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 867–77 (13th ed. 2015) (presenting Spur after
Boomer); SHERWIN & BRAY, supra note 76, at 484– 87 (including Spur immediately
after Boomer in its discussion on injunctions); WEAVER ET AL., supra note 77, at
335–40 (including Spur after Boomer).
420. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 181, at 196–97 (working out an elaborate,
apparently counter-factual, example that Farnsworth considers bizarre).
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transition, if no new calves were added and finished steers were
sold, it wouldn’t be too complex and expensive for the feedlot to
leave vacant lots where new lawns would be greener.421
Spur “has not been followed by other courts.”422 The possibility
of a plaintiff-pays solution would repel possible plaintiffs.423
Because so far as a legal researcher can learn, no other court has
ever followed it in private nuisance or trespass litigation, the
attention scholars and casebook editors pay to Spur needs to be
explained. Spur, if not a one-off solution, is an outlier.424 Is
casebook coverage misplaced, even odd?425 Boomer and Spur, even
if the instructor criticizes both, are beneficial teaching cases
because they show students courts’ flexibility in choosing between
damages and an injunction followed by developing the injunction’s
terms.426
In my opinion, the Spur approach also fails in private trespass
and nuisance litigation because it doesn’t consider proportion,
fairness, and the utility of the parties’ activity. Spur deserves to be
isolated in private nuisance and trespass litigation because the
notion that the winning plaintiff should pay the losing defendant
destabilizes owners’ private property rights.427 Professor Richard
Epstein called Rule 4 “[an] enormous risk,” “grotesque,”
“misguided,” and “wholly subversive of any account of ordinary
property rights.”428

421. See Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 704 (Ariz.
1972).
422. JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 514 (4th ed. 2017);
see also FARNSWORTH, supra note 181, at 195 (noting that Rule (4) is “rarely” used
in litigation); DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 119, at 538 (“So far, however, other
courts have not had occasion to employ the compensated injunction, much less to
extend it.”). Professor Bray, however, finds an analogy to the compensated
injunction in the Maxim “those who seek equity must do equity.” Bray, supra note
49, at 78.
423. See CALABRESI, supra note 41, at n.51 (explaining that reverse damages
create a “free-rider” problem where many potential plaintiffs in a nuisance action
would not join in litigation in hopes that others would bear the cost).
424. See SPRANKLING, supra note 422, at 514.
425. See Smith, supra note 252, at 1007–10.
426. See Spur, 494 P.2d at 707.
427. See Smith, supra note 252, at 1010, 1044.
428. Epstein, supra note 259, at 2103–05.
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Spur Industries’ compensated-nuisance injunction has joined
nuisance parties’ post-injunction negotiation in law school
classroom hypotheticals. But does it otherwise rest idly on the
economists’ shelf?
Rule 4, however, isn’t dead.429 A comprehensive, accurate view
of legal reality includes settlements, other private remedies, and
public regulation.430
The parties in a land-use dispute could negotiate a Spur-type
compensated injunction as a private settlement. Before mutual
enmity develops, they might consider a plaintiff-pays-defendant
solution when anticipated litigation costs will be high and the
plaintiff’s gain from ending the defendant’s tort exceeds the
defendant’s loss from ceasing its challenged activity.
Another possible plaintiff-pays solution occurs in employment
litigation about a former employee’s covenant not to disclose or
compete. Requiring an employer who is enforcing a covenant
against a former employee to pay the former employee’s salary and
benefits during her period of unemployment, Ms. Passi uses the
Rule 4 compensated injunction as an analogy to the United
Kingdom doctrine of garden leave.431
Finally, the Cathedral’s co-architect, Mr. Melamed, cites
examples based on his experience in the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice, in the inner-beltway’s world of government
regulation.432 These examples, he says, demonstrate that “Rule 4
is alive and well—at least in Washington.”433
Rule 4, however, should not qualify as a viable solution in
assessing positive-law remedies for trespass and nuisance in
private litigation.

429. See CALABRESI, supra note 41, at 20.
430. See id.
431. See Sonya P. Passi, Note, Compensated Injunctions: A More Equitable
Solution to the Problem of Inevitable Disclosure, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 927,
941– 55, 949 (2012).
432. See A. Douglas Melamed, Remarks: A Public Law Perspective, 106 YALE
L.J. 2209, 2209–10 (1997).
433. Id. at 2209.
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IV. Rule 5: Does the Cathedral Have Too Many or
Too Few Rooms?

The Cathedral article’s four approaches are both too many and
too few.
A. Too Many Rooms
The Cathedral article’s four approaches to remedies are too
many because, as noted above, Rule 3, a court’s no-liability
decision, isn’t a remedy.434 Also common law courts’ decisions that
implement Rule 2, find a nuisance exists, decline to enjoin, and
grant the plaintiff damages are scarce.435 Moreover, since the
single example of Spur, Rule 4, the winner-pays, compensated
injunction, is rare indeed today, perhaps extinct in private trespass
and nuisance litigation.436
B. Too Few Rooms
The Cathedral doesn’t have enough rooms to house the court’s
possible remedies for a defendant’s trespass or nuisance. In
litigation that sheds light on the question of the defendant’s
liability, as well as the choice of remedy, in 2007 in Fancher v.
Fagella,437 the Virginia Supreme Court dealt with a next-door
neighbor’s lawsuit about the defendant’s sweet-gum tree’s
encroaching roots.438 The existing Virginia precedent for a
neighbor’s tree-root invasion was a no-nuisance, Rule 3, approach
that limited the encroached-upon landowner to self-help at the
property line.439 The Virginia court, after concluding that the
earlier precedent was obsolete in an urban setting,440 adopted a
trespass-based substantive rule leading to the defendant’s liability
434.
435.
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.

See supra notes 199–222 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 227–230 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 409–433 and accompanying text.
650 S.E.2d 519 (Va. 2007).
See id. at 520.
See id. at 521.
See id. at 522.
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for an encroachment and to a possible injunctive remedy that
hinged on the judge’s equitable discretion, exercised in the
particular context.441
After appearing to balance the hardships, the Boomer court
had moved from an injunction remedy to a no-injunction remedy.442
The Fancher court abandoned a no-remedy, no-injunction rule and
adopted an opening for an injunction remedy.443 In the view taken
here, Fancher’s liability decision and its broadened remedies
present a superior approach for modern-day nuisance and trespass
disputes as compared to Boomer v. Atlantic Cement’s move from an
injunctive to a damages approach for a nuisance.
We don’t know how later litigation and the Virginia trial
judge’s equitable discretion might have resolved the choice of
remedy because, shortly before the Virginia Supreme Court’s
decision, Fagella, with a damages trial pending, cut down the
aggressive sweet-gum, which effectively mooted Fancher’s prayer
for an injunction.444
This bemused observer speculates that if the dispute had
continued to an injunction, Fancher and Fagella would have been
less than effusive to negotiate a settlement. Between amiable
neighbors, however, a negotiated settlement would eliminate the
time and expense of litigation and, if the non-tree owner agreed to
split the cost of removal, might include a “winner-pays” Rule 4
feature.445
1. The Standards Injunction
The Boomer court’s bipolar choice between a shutdown
injunction and damages is oversimplified. After selecting the
plaintiff’s remedy, the second part of the court’s remedial analysis

441. See id. at 523.
442. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement, 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 1970).
443. See supra notes 437–441 and accompanying text.
444. See Brigid Schulte, Va. High Court Breaks New Ground on Tree Liability,
WASH.
POST,
(Sept.
15,
2007),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/09/14/AR2007091401340.html?noredirect=on
(last
visited Dec. 3, 2018) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
445. See supra notes 409–433 and accompanying text.
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is to measure and define that remedy.446 The judge’s choice of
remedy is broader than either a shutdown injunction or permanent
damages.447 Positing a court’s choice of remedy as one between a
shuttering injunction and awarding permanent diminution
damages overlooks the refinements that grow out of the distinction
between a defendant’s permanent trespass or encroachment and
its temporary continuing tort.
The court’s injunction may take many forms. Both the Boomer
court and the Cathedral article neglect an important intermediate
possibility between the defendant’s continuation and its
shut-down.
A court may deal with the defendant’s nuisance by allowing it
to continue operation after minimizing its harmful or offensive
activity, a “standards” injunction.448 In 1927, Judge Learned Hand
demonstrated this method of accommodating the conflicting
interests of landowner and manufacturer in Smith v. Staso Milling
Co.449 As Farber observed, the Boomer court’s majority opinion
fails to consider the possibility of an injunction “that would
mitigate the harm to the plaintiffs, such as a lower level of
operation, changes in the scheduling of blasting, [or] construction
of barriers between the plaintiff’s land and the plant.”450
The judge has equitable discretion to employ a pragmatic
experimental-conditional standards injunction that orders the
defendant to add technology to control or reduce undesirable or
unhealthy features as well as to limit the times and magnitude of
operations and types of activity.451 The order may set time, place,
and manner limits on pollution.452 The judge may require periodic
reports and set timetables and goals.453
The judge’s standards-injunction script may read something
like this: call for the parties to negotiate a consent decree, to come
446.
447.
448.

See Fancher, 650 S.E.2d at 523.
See id.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 941 cmt. e (AM. LAW. INST. 1979);
DOBBS & ROBERTS, supra note 119, at 540–41.
449. See Smith v. Staso Milling Co., 18 F.2d 736, 738 (2d Cir. 1927).
450. Farber, supra note 75, at 20.
451. See Payne v. Skaar, 900 P.2d 1352, 1354 (Idaho 1995); Goeke v. Nat’l
Farms, 512 N.W. 2d 626, 632 (Neb. 1994).
452. See Payne, 900 P.2d at 1354.
453. See Goeke, 512 N.W.2d at 632.

REHABILITATING THE NUISANCE INJUNCTION

1931

back to the courtroom with plans to abate and coordinate. Conduct
a hearing on the parties’ plans or their proposed consent decree.
Based on the best features of the plans, order the defendant to
change the way it operates to end offensive features. Limit times,
limit type of activity, require ameliorative devices. Call for a later
periodic report. Set goals. Schedule another cycle of plans and
hearings.
The injunction will reserve the judge’s ability to modify the
order in light of changed circumstances.454 Because of defendant’s
improvements, the Iowa court, citing changed factual conditions,
vacated an injunction that shut a cement plant down.455 The
Supreme Court in 1907 granted the state of Georgia a “standards”
injunction,456
which
several
years
later
became
a
457
stop-unless-standards-are-met injunction.
The standards injunction resembles a structural injunction in
constitutional litigation. The structural injunction is a judicial
technique to bring a large and complex institution into compliance
with the law.458 Courts have used structural injunctions to end
school segregation where it was required or permitted.459 Another
branch of the structural injunction, developed by courts in
Arkansas in the 1970s, brought prisons and jails into compliance
with the law.460 Industrial pollution is another large and complex
legal problem that is amenable to the structural injunction process.
Courts’ experience with structural injunctions against
government defendants should convince judges that concern about
supervision, about becoming managers rather than judges, is
exaggerated.461
454. See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5)–(6) (allowing relief from final judgment in
instances where applying the judgment prospectively would be inequitable, or for
“any other reason that justifies relief”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 941,
cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
455. See Helmkamp v. Clark Ready Mix Co., 249 N.W.2d 655, 657 (Iowa 1977).
456. See Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 239 (1907).
457. See Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474, 477–78 (1915).
458. See OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION 7, 9 (1978).
459. See id. at 13–14.
460. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING
AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 78
(Alfred Blumstein & David Farrington eds., 1998).
461. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION § 2.5(4),
at 143–44 (2d ed. 1993).
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In the 1970s, courts didn’t have as much experience managing
institutions as they do today. Federal school-desegregation
litigation in the South was emerging from freedom-of-choice;462
courts had not begun to grant complex prison injunctions.463
Perhaps in the early 1970s, the New York Court of Appeals wasn’t
ready to transfer judicial experience in operating institutions to
industrial management and pollution control. That time has
passed; the time is ripe for courts to grant structural-standards
injunctions to ameliorate and control pollution.
2. Damages
A nuisance plaintiff’s damages aren’t a set amount,
diminution, or value before less value after. In 2016, Judge
Calabresi rejected the idea that the nuisance plaintiff’s damages
“should mimic or approach the negotiated price that would obtain
in a free market.”464 Instead damages might vary according to
“collective” judgments, sometimes below, sometimes equaling,
sometimes above compensatory damages levels.465 The court can
consider a plaintiff’s special damages, her personal injury
damages, and damages based on buffer-zone value.466 The Iowa
court, after first balancing the hardships to refuse plaintiffs an
injunction,467 then added special damages to their permanent
diminution damages: the plaintiffs’ temporary damages may be
rent-based and include their discomfort.468
Farber wrote that a judge who denies a nuisance plaintiff an
injunction should measure his money recovery by the market value
for buffer-zone rights instead of by value before less value after.469
On remand, Atlantic Cement, perhaps prodded by the trial court’s
462. See FISS, supra note 459, at 9.
463. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 460, at 78.
464. CALABRESI, supra note 41, at 118.
465. See id. at 118–20.
466. See DOBBS ET. AL., supra note 131, § 404.
467. See Weinhold v. Wolff, 555 N.W.2d 454, 467 (Iowa 1996).
468. See id. at 466.
469. See Daniel Farber, Reassessing Boomer: Justice, Efficiency, and
Nuisance Law, in PROPERTY LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
JOHN E. CRIBBET 19 (Peter Hay & Michael H. Hoeflich eds., 1988).
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apparent buffer-zone measure of damages, bought out most of the
plaintiffs to create the buffer zone that some observers think it
should have purchased before it built its cement plant.470
Courts have flexible injunction-damages options for nuisance
and trespass remedies. Consider, for example, the spectrum of
options that the trial judge in Harrison, discussed above, had for
defendant’s automobile shredder after the Court of Appeals
remanded.471 The options included: (a) The judge could find that no
nuisance exists; (b) The judge could change the earlier permanent
nuisance decision to a temporary nuisance with temporary
damages dating from its beginning to the date of trial and a
shut-down injunction stopping the shredder’s hammers in the
future; (c) The judge could find a temporary nuisance, award the
homeowners damages down to the date of trial, and let plaintiffs
sue for damages in the future if defendant’s nuisance continued; or
(d) The judge could find a permanent nuisance and refuse to grant
plaintiffs an injunction, but award plaintiffs permanent damages
for the diminished value of their property, the solution in
Boomer.472 The Court of Appeals seemed to favor (e) an
experimental-conditional standards injunction as discussed
above.473
The court’s possible remedial solutions for a defendant’s
trespass or nuisance aren’t limited to the injunctions and
compensatory damages that this Article has considered above. Two
other money remedies for a successful plaintiff are punitive
damages and restitution.
3. Punitive Damages
A nuisance or trespass plaintiff may recover punitive
damages.474 Punitive damages add complex recalculation to our
470. See Laycock, supra note 61, at 34; Smith, supra note 252, at 1039.
471. See Harrison v. Ind. Auto Shredders Co., 528 F.2d 1107, 1125 (7th Cir.
1975).
472. See Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 875 (N.Y. 1970).
473. See Harrison, 528 F.2d at 1125.
474. See Oglethorpe Power Corp. v. Estate of Forrister, 774 S.E.2d 755, 763
(Ga. App. 2015). As this Article goes to press, three of the twenty-six lawsuits
brought in North Carolina by 500 plaintiffs against Smithfield Foods’s pork
production facilities have reached jury verdicts. The plaintiffs’ verdicts in the
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topic.475 Judge Calabresi wrote in 2016 that punitive damages
deter short of a criminal sanction and approach inalienability.476
Professor Henry Smith wrote that “supra-compensatory” punitive
damages convert a “liability” or damages rule into a “property” or
injunction rule.477
“Inalienability” and “supra-compensatory” aren’t accurate
ways to describe punitive damages.478 A court will impose punitive
damages after, perhaps long after, the defendant’s tort.479 Courts
base punitive damages on an entirely different policy foundation
than compensatory damages. A court awards a plaintiff punitive
damages to punish the defendant’s completed, aggravated wrong,
nuisance or trespass, and to deter that defendant and others from
similar misconduct in the future.480 Punitive damages don’t affect
alienability. On the other hand, the judge grants the plaintiff an
injunction to forbid the defendant’s future misconduct.481
Considering several ways to measure a nuisance plaintiff’s
compensatory damages helps us to understand that punitive
damages don’t prevent alienation and aren’t an injunction. In
Boomer, the lowest compensatory general damages measure was
value before less value after, apparently the trial judge’s initial
three trials included punitive damages of $23 million, $25 million, and $450
million. Because of a tort-reform cap on punitive damages in North Carolina, the
trial judges reduced the punitive damages to $250,000 for each plaintiff. Greg
Blount, William Droze & Kathryn Warihay, Punitive Damages in North Carolina
Hog Farm Cases Reduced, ENVTL. L. & POL’Y MONITOR (Aug. 7, 2018),
https://www.environmentallawandpolicy.com/2018/08/punitive-damages-northcarolina-hog-farm-cases-reduced/#page=1 (last visited Dec. 3, 2018) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review). See also DOBBS ET. AL., supra note 131,
§ 404, at 644. The Constitution and tort-reform statutes limit the amount of
punitive damages. Id. § 485, at 48, § 486, at 57.
475. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1126 n.71; DOBBS ET. AL.,
supra note 131, § 56, at 152, § 404, at 644.
476. See CALABRESI, supra note 41, at 120.
477. Smith, supra note 252, at 983, 1008. This common idea may have
originated with Calabresi and Melamed: “[P]unitive damages provide an extra
compensation for the victim.” Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1126 n.71;
see also Golden, supra note 335, at 1415 n.70 (citing economic-analysis scholars
who view punitive damages as property rules).
478. See Laycock, supra note 61, at 35.
479. See Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1354 (Me. 1985).
480. See id. at 1355.
481. See Okla. Pub. Emp. Ass’n v. Okla. Dep’t. of Cent. Servs., 55 P.3d 1072,
1081 (2002).
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$185,000.482 The damages measure based on the defendant’s cost
to secure a buffer zone was $710,000, which was result on
remand.483 A defendant like Atlantic Cement with a $45 million
investment would clearly prefer to pay either measure of
compensatory damages instead of an injunction.484 A court would
have to add a gigantic punitive damages verdict to the
compensatory damages to take the plaintiff’s money recovery out
of the realm of damages and into the realm of an injunction.
4. Restitution
In addition to an injunction, compensatory damages, and
punitive damages, a court’s major remedy is restitution to reverse
or prevent the defendant’s unjust enrichment, a remedy that the
Cathedral article does not discuss. Courts have based several
important restitution decisions on defendants’ property torts,
conversions and trespasses.485
When a court discusses a plaintiff’s nuisance remedies,
however, the traditional answer has been that that the nuisance
plaintiff’s money recovery comprises only compensatory damages
and perhaps punitive damages, but does not include restitution.486
Should a contemporary court expand its nuisance-remedies
options to include awarding the plaintiff restitution? A positive
answer follows.

482. Boomer, 257 N.E. 2d at 873.
483. Daniel Farber, Reassessing Boomer: Justice, Efficiency, and Nuisance
Law, in PROPERTY LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN E.
CRIBBET 12 (Peter Hay & Michael H. Hoeflich eds., 1988).
484. See id. at 18.
485. See Edwards v. Lee’s Adm’r, 96 S.W.2d 1028, 1032 (Ky. 1936); Raven Red
Ash Coal Co. v. Ball, 39 S.E. 2d 231, 238 (Va. 1946); Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co.,
173 P.2d 652, 654 (Wash. 1946).
486. See GEORGE E. PALMER, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 137 (1978); see also
Daniel Friedmann, Restitution of Benefits Obtained Through the Appropriation of
Property or the Commission of a Wrong, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 504, 509 n.28 (1980);
Nicholas McBride, Restitution for Wrongs, in THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT: CRITICAL AND COMPARATIVE ESSAYS 251,
259 (Charles Mitchell & William Swadling eds., 2013) (“[A]llowing [a party] to sue
for the ‘saved cost of abatement would be inequitable’ . . . . Therefore, [the party]
will be entitled to sue . . . for license fee damages instead.”).
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Taking a fresh look in 1997, Professor Andrew Kull wrote that
“restitution for the economic benefits [defendant] derived from a
private nuisance makes a perfectly intelligible claim in any case
where the nuisance could have been enjoined, so long as the
defendant can be shown to have acted willfully in invading the
plaintiff’s property.”487 A few years later, after Kull became
Reporter for the Third Restatement of Restitution, the
Restatement included an Illustration based on Boomer’s facts.488
The Illustration concludes that for the defendant’s nuisance, “the
court might award [plaintiffs] restitution . . . measured by the
reasonable value of a license . . . to continue the [defendant’s]
challenged operations.”489
Professor Farber also formulated a restitution remedy for the
Boomer nuisance plaintiffs: if the trial court had measured
plaintiff’s money recovery by the amount an ordinary buyer would
have had to pay, that measure would have been a bargain for a
buyer like Atlantic Cement that was assembling a large tract.490
[Atlantic] would be unjustly enriched in the amount of the
premium it would otherwise have had to pay for the buffer zone.
Thus the [plaintiffs’ buffer-zone] damage award can be
considered a form of restitution, putting the parties in the same
position that they would have been in if Atlantic had done the
right thing in the first place and purchased a buffer zone.491

Farber’s formulation isn’t easy to fit into technical restitution
learning.492 Perhaps a better way to articulate a restitution
measure for nuisance or trespass that reaches the same result is

487. Andrew Kull, Restitution and the Noncontractual Transfer, 11 J. CONT.
L. 93, 104 (1997).
488. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 44,
illus. 15 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
489. Id.; see also Marmo v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 457 F.3d 748, 764 (8th
Cir. 2006) (Arnold, J., dissenting).
490. See Daniel Farber, Reassessing Boomer: Justice, Efficiency, and
Nuisance Law, in PROPERTY LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
JOHN E. CRIBBET 18 (Peter Hay & Michael H. Hoeflich eds., 1988); see also Farber,
supra note 75, at 22.
491. Farber, supra note 75, at 22.
492. Laycock cites RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT § 51 (AM. LAW INST. 2011), which requires a defendant to disgorge
profits. Laycock, supra note 61, at 34.
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the Restatement’s: to measure the plaintiff’s restitution by the
reasonable value of a license.493
Both punitive damages and restitution are potential remedies
for a defendant’s trespass or nuisance, opening a new wing on the
Cathedral.
V. Procedure, the Jury, and Equitable Cleanup
Whether the judge ought to grant the plaintiff an injunction
or award him damages and how to combine and measure the
remedies follows a tricky procedural path that complicates the
judge’s remedial decisions in nuisance and trespass litigation.
Avoiding a jury may explain the form of relief.
To begin with, a dispute where the plaintiff sought both an
injunction and damages was complex to try earlier because of
separate courts of Chancery or Equity and Common Law.494 Before
the separate courts of Chancery-Equity and Common Law were
merged, two trials might have been necessary, one in Chancery for
an injunction and another at Common Law for damages.495
The federal and almost all state court systems have merged
the Chancery and Common Law courts.496 Merger of Chancery and
Common Law means only one potential plenary trial on the
plaintiff’s nuisance or trespass claims because the merged court
has power to award a successful plaintiff damages and to enter an
injunction.497 The litigants’ constitutional right to a jury trial for
damages adds procedural and remedial complexity.498
In a merged court, if the plaintiff moves for interlocutory
equitable relief, a temporary restraining order or a preliminary

493. See DOUG RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, REMEDIES 1216–17 (9th ed.
2018).
494. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., JOHN LEUBSDORF & DEBRA LYN BASSETT,
CIVIL PROCEDURE 532–33 (6th ed. 2011).
495. See id. at 552–53.
496. See id. at 543 (“Unification came about in many of the states through
adoption of the Field Code in the nineteenth century. Unification came about in
the federal court system through adoption of the Federal Rules in 1938.”).
497. See id.
498. See id. at 543–47.
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injunction, the judge will conduct a juryless pre-trial hearing, then
grant or deny the plaintiff’s motion.499
At the plenary trial where the plaintiff seeks both damages
and an injunction, either party would be entitled to a
constitutional jury trial on the plaintiff’s claim for money damages,
but neither party has a jury-trial right for the plaintiff’s demand
for an injunction or other equitable relief.500 The judge may,
however, empanel an advisory jury to evaluate the equitable
claims.501
Professor Klass’s experience supported the idea that a
carefully instructed jury could sort out complex multiple
substantive claims.502 Suppose a jury trial ends with a plaintiff’s
jury verdict that a nuisance exists and the amount of the plaintiff’s
past damages. Then the judge alone would decide whether to grant
the plaintiff’s motion for a permanent injunction.503 If there had
been an advisory jury, the judge would decide whether to accept
the jury’s advisory findings.504 Under federal and some state
precedents, the judge’s permanent-injunction decision must be
consistent with the jury’s findings of fact.505 If the judge were to
refuse to grant the plaintiff a permanent injunction, the jury could
be recalled to set the plaintiff’s permanent or future damages.
499. See id. at 556–59.
500. See Tamalunis v. City of Georgetown, 542 N.E.2d 402, 413 (Ill. App. Ct.
1989) (“The granting of an injunction is a matter of discretion for a circuit court.”);
Weinhold v. Wolff, 555 N.W.2d 454, 458, 462 (Iowa 1996) (noting that the parties
elected for a bench trial); Goeke v. Nat’l Farms, 512 N.W.2d 626, 632 (Neb. 1994)
(noting that an action for an injunction is equitable). But see Payne v. Skaar, 900
P.2d 1352, 1354 n.1 (Idaho 1995) (noting that an advisory jury was employed
because public and private nuisance claims are equitable).
501. See Klass, supra note 23, at 715.
502. See id. at 680.
503. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006);
Tamalunis, 542 N.E.2d at 413; Weinhold, 555 N.W.2d at 458 (“Weinholds sued at
law and asked for damages and injunctive relief. The case was therefore triable
at law, but the appropriateness of injunctive relief was solely for the district court
to decide.”).
504. See Payne, 900 P.2d at 1354 n.1.
505. See Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510–11 (1959); HAZARD
ET. AL., supra note 494, at 565; Eric J. Hamilton, Note, Federalism and the State
Civil Jury Rights, 65 STAN. L. REV. 851, 868 (2013) (explaining that twenty-two
states follow the federal rule created by Beacon Theatres, while eighteen follow
the traditional approach).
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Equitable cleanup is a second one-trial possibility which many
state courts would follow.506 The judge hears the parties’ evidence
in Chancery without a jury and decides the defendant’s
substantive liability and whether to grant the plaintiff a
permanent injunction.507 Then the judge will “clean the case up,”
that is decide the damages issues also without a jury.508 The
skeptics’ question about equitable cleanup is whether, in aid of
consistency and judicial economy, it undervalues the litigants’
constitutional rights to a jury trial.509
The Boomer majority quoted the Indiana court’s Vesey
equitable-cleanup decision:
When the trial court refused injunctive relief to the [plaintiff]
upon the ground of public interest in the continuance of the gas
plant, it properly retained jurisdiction of the case and awarded
full compensation to the [plaintiff]. This is upon the general
equitable principle that equity will give full relief in one action
and prevent a multiplicity [of suits].510

Approving a conditional injunction as part of equitable
cleanup, the Alabama court observed that “a court of equity has
power to mold its relief to meet the equities developed in the
trial.”511
The form of relief in Boomer has puzzled observers.512 As
mentioned above, the court granted plaintiffs an injunction but
stayed its effect as long as the defendant paid plaintiffs’
damages.513 Laycock questioned the court’s “circumlocution” for
refusing an injunction.514 He speculated that the conditional
506. See Hamilton, supra note 505, at 856.
507. See id.
508. See, e.g., Goeke, 512 N.W.2d at 632–633 (upholding the trial judge’s
assessment of damages); see also DOBBS, supra note 119, at 169 (2d ed. 1993);
HAZARD, LEUBSDORF & BASSETT, supra note 494, § 12.2, at 533–55.
509. See Ziebarth v. Kalenze, 238 N.W.2d 261, 266–268 (N.D. 1976); DOBBS,
supra note 119, at 169; HAZARD, LEUBSDORF & BASSETT, supra note 494, § 12.2, at
533–39.
510. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., Inc., 257 N.E.2d 870, 874 (N.Y. 1970)
(quoting N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Vesey, 200 N.E. 620, 627 (1936)).
511. Baldwin v. McClendon, 288 So.2d 761, 766 (Ala. 1974).
512. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Story of Boomer: Pollution and the
Common Law, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 113, 121, 133 (2005).
513. See Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 877.
514. See Laycock, supra note 61, at 17–19.
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injunction may have allowed the judge to retain jurisdiction and
supervise the cement company while it ameliorated its nuisance.515
Another possibility in Boomer is that the court may have used the
conditional injunction to keep the lawsuit in Chancery-Equity in
order to grant the plaintiff permanent damages instead of an
injunction without a jury.516 More specifically, granting the
injunction and suspending it may have rationalized equitable
cleanup and lack of a jury.517
VI. Conclusion
Every profession has its array of public perceptions that are
widely held, deeply believed, and oft-stated but, at best,
misleading; in legal-latin, these are ignis fatuus, delusive guiding
principles. In aid of expanding and broadening the injunction
remedy, this Article has challenged a well-established way of
looking at the law of nuisance and trespass. It has criticized the
Boomer decision518 and the Cathedral article519 and suggested
refinements that increase plaintiffs’ injunctions.520 By proving an
existing theory wrong, we refine our understanding of what our
models can and cannot explain.
The Boomer decision and the Cathedral article are influential
sources. Timely and easy to understand, both were formative for
law-and-economics scholars who were ready for their powerful
simplicity and conservative, business-protective solutions.521 Have
they stood the test of time?

515. See id. at 18.
516. See id. (explaining that once a case was filed in equity, the court had
authority to decide the entire case, and therefore, the authority to assess damages
without a jury relied on the plaintiff’s decision to merely request an injunction).
517. See id. at 17–18 (reconciling Boomer’s “absurd” rules with the history of
equity courts that denied the right to a jury and stating that the claim of equitable
jurisdiction perhaps “felt more secure if the court actually issued the injunction,
even if that injunction was issued conditionally or suspended immediately”).
518. See supra Part II.
519. See supra Part III.
520. See supra Part IV.
521. See Butler, supra note 24, at 879 n.187.
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An analogy from science to law invoked by Thomas Kuhn’s The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions522 will be evocative here. A
comfortable intellectual life favors an exemplar or paradigm like
the Cathedral article’s four-category system that enables people to
think that a piece of the world makes sense.523 But as things
change, shift happens. Anomalies accumulate that do not make
sense within the earlier paradigm. The conventional wisdom is
durable, not shaken by a few unexplained applications. The
paradigm changes only when insiders believe that the current
paradigm doesn’t explain many anomalies. When a set of ideas is
no longer up to the task of explaining the world and needs to be
replaced, people develop a new bundle of beliefs to put events in a
different light.
This Article maintains that analysis based on the Cathedral
article needs to be refined.524 It places liability after remedy.525 It
combines remedy and liability.526 The real world is complex and
nuanced instead of being primary and theoretical. The parties’
post-injunction negotiation may, but doesn’t always, occur. The
four-category world of solutions is both too simple and not simple
enough. Despite the scholarly “cottage industry,”527 it doesn’t
describe court decisions or positive law. Instead it points courts in
the wrong remedial direction. The faulty theorizing in law schools
has diverted teaching and scholarship into theoretical
conundrums. Human nature is too ambiguous and variable to
explain with all-purpose microeconomic analysis based on
cash-preferred motives.
A 2011 “concise” property casebook “suitable and teachable in
a one-semester Property course” may foreshadow what the future
portends.528 Both Boomer and Spur are reduced to footnote status;
522. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (4th ed.
2012).
523. See id. at 23 (“[T]he paradigm functions by permitting the replication of
examples . . . . In a science . . . a paradigm is rarely an object for replication.
Instead, like an accepted judicial decision in the common law, it is an object for
further articulation and specification under new or more stringent conditions.”).
524. See supra Parts III–IV.
525. See supra Part IV.
526. See supra Part IV.
527. FARNSWORTH, supra note 181, at 193.
528. DAVID L. CALLIES, J. GORDON HYLTON, JOHN MARTINEZ & DANIEL R.
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moreover, the nuisance material does not cite the Cathedral
article.529 The 2017 edition of a Remedies casebook references
Boomer only within another principle decision.530 New ideas begin
to percolate through the profession and the academy and fall into
place. But the change comes slowly because people who are
mentally within the former paradigm cannot understand what is
happening. Many will continue to reason “Cathedral all the way
down,” that is, the court should favor damages because an
injunction is absolute protection, a stone wall, and the court should
prefer a “liability rule” that merely “discourages violations”
because litigants will bargain around an injunction.531
“[Q]uarrels over language and terminology mask, and
sometimes reveal, quarrels over world view . . . .”532 Changing
nomenclature changes ideas.533 So, more than changing the
profession’s vocabulary, I wrote this Article to change the way the
profession thinks about the issues involved in nuisance and
trespass remedies. It doesn’t seek merely new categories but to
break the mold to develop a more functional approach.
“[R]eorganizing a field of law,” Laycock wrote, “is hard—hard
to figure out, hard to disseminate, hard to implement.”534 The law’s
creative-destructive process never ends. An optimist seconds Lord
Mansfield’s observation that, in the long run, “the common
law . . . works itself pure . . . .”535

MANDELKER, CONCISE INTRODUCTION TO PROPERTY LAW, at v (2011).
529. See id. at 340 (discussing Boomer and Spur in note 4). Three of the
editors’ casebooks cite Boomer and Spur only in notes, employs
injunction-damages to describe remedies, and does not cite the Cathedral article
in the discussion at all. DAVID L. CALLIES, DANIEL R. MANDELKER, & J. GORDON
HYLTON, PROPERTY LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: CASES AND MATERIALS 153—54
(4th ed. 2016).
530
TRACY A. THOMAS, DAVID I. LEVINE & DAVID J. JUNG, REMEDIES: PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE 137–38 (6th ed. 2017) (referencing Boomer within Walgreen Co. v.
Sara Creek Property Co., 966 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1992)).
531. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 320, at 715–18.
532. IRVING HOWE, A MARGIN OF HOPE: AN INTELLECTUAL AUTOBIOGRAPHY 77
(1982).
533. See id.
534. Douglas Laycock, How Remedies Became a Field: A History, 27 REV.
LITIG. 161, 267 (2008).
535. See Omychund v. Barker (1744) 26 Eng. Rep. 15, 23; 1 Atk. 22, 34.
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Number six in all-time citations, the iconic Cathedral article
has a well-established place in the firmament.536 As the late
Professor Leach reminded us, however, “great men and their great
books create problems. They tend to freeze things in antique
patterns.”537 I don’t entertain for an instant the notion that this
modest piece will overthrow two generations of vested intellectual
interest, entrenched “knowledge,” and vocabulary about nuisance
and trespass remedies. Nobel-prize winning economist Tom
Schelling reminded us that “[t]he lesson that may need to be
learned over and over, a lesson that possibly no one can ever apply,
is the extraordinary difficulty of pulling out of a situation in which
one has invested heavily.”538 But I do hope that this modest effort
will play a part in a process of refining and displacing outmoded
analysis. For one thing, our law students are confused enough.
Their professors should exit the four-room Cathedral and refute its
analysis. This Article may be the last tour of the Cathedral they
need to take.
This Article is part of a process of creative reconstruction of
granting injunctions in nuisance, trespass, and other
environmental litigation. The court should ask three questions.
First, is the defendant liable under properly defined substantive
law? Second, what remedy should the court grant; an injunction,
compensatory damages, or perhaps punitive damages and
restitution? Balancing the parties’ hardships may be necessary to
choose between damages and an injunction, but a narrow and
precise test is a crucial principle of confinement. Finally, how
should the court measure or define the injunction or money
recovery? Questions two and three will not always be discrete or
separate. The judge might consider what an injunction ought to
require or forbid along with whether to grant it. Denying a
nuisance or trespass plaintiff an injunction may often be unsound
for health or environmental reasons. A standards injunction may
be the most propitious remedy.

536. Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles
of All Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1489 (2012).
537. W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities: The Nutshell Revisited, 78 HARV. L. REV.
973, 973 (1965).
538. SCHELLING, supra note 355, at 231; see also KAHNEMAN, supra note 54, at
277.
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A reinvigorated private law remedial approach may counter
the federal regulatory retreat. More and more detailed standard
injunctions in private litigation will improve our shared
environment; moreover, the private-law example may work its way
into public-law environmental litigation, where it may contribute
to reducing global warming and climate change.

